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WWW.OBSCENITY.COM: 
AN ANALYSIS OF OBSCENITY AND INDECENCY REGULATION ON THE INTERNET 
 
“ ‘Uncle Sam Out Of My Homepage!’ ” 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you sit down at your personal computer and log on to the Internet to 
access Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s recent report on the alleged relationship 
between President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky.2  To your surprise, a screen appears 
requesting you input your credit card number to prove you are of the requisite age to 
view the report.  Now imagine you have no credit card, or more realistically, you do not 
feel comfortable giving your credit card number to an unknown party over a 
communication system which spans the globe.  Therefore, because you do not own a 
credit card or you wish to maintain your privacy, you are prohibited from reading 
constitutionally protected material regarding the developments in our nation’s 
democracy.  Unfortunately, this is the reality of the Child Online Protection Act 
(COPA),3 Congress’ latest attempt to regulate Internet content. 
 
This comment explores the constitutionality of federal regulations as applied to 
Internet content and alternatives to government regulation.  Part II provides background 
on the Internet, First Amendment obscenity and indecency law as applied to 
communications media, and past and current legislation enacted to regulate Internet 
content.  Part III analyzes the constitutionality of COPA, and discusses why other 
alternatives are more effective and preferable to government regulation.  Part IV 
concludes that protecting children from harmful Internet content is the responsibility of 
parents, and therefore, Internet regulation should begin at home. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A.  The Internet: Its History and How it Works 
 
The Internet began in 1969 as a project of the Advanced Research Project Agency 
Network, ARPANET, a branch of the Department of Defense.4  The Agency set up a 
                                                 
1  Janelle Brown, CDA--The Sequel, SALON MAGAZINE (Sept. 23, 1998) 
<http://www.salonmagazine.com/ 21st/feature/1998/09/23feature2.html> [hereinafter Sequel]. 
2  The government released the Starr Report over the Internet on September 11, 1998.  USA 
Today Tech Report (visited Oct. 15, 1998) 
<http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/ctd392.htm>.  The report was available on the 
following government web sites: <http://thomas.loc.gov/icreport>, 
<http://www.house.gov/icreport>, http://www. access.gpo.gov/congress/icreport>, 
<http://www.house.gov/judiciary>. 
3  PUB. L. NO. 105-277, 112 STAT . 2681 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998)).  On November 
19, 1998, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a 
motion for a temporary restraining order and halted enforcement of COPA until a court 
resolves its constitutionality.  Michael Rubinkam, Judge Suspends Internet Law, The Child 
Online Protection Act Seeks to Protect Children From Online Pornography, YORK DAILY 
RECORD (Philadelphia), Nov. 20, 1998, at A-02.  On February 1, 1999, United States District 
Judge Lowell A. Reed issued a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of COPA.  Leslie 
Miller, Judge Block’s Net Porn Law Ruling Cites Free-Speech Protection, USA TODAY, Feb. 
2, 1999 at 01A, available in Westlaw PAPERS File. 
4  Maureen A. O’Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 
1
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computer network via phone lines designed to withstand nuclear attack so that the 
government and researchers could communicate over great distances, regardless of the 
type of computer used.5  Computers from universities, corporations, and individuals 
began to connect to the network and by the late 1980’s, it evolved into a giant network 
of networks.6   
 
The Internet consists of computers linked together to form small networks, and 
those networks are linked to other networks through routers7 and software protocols.8  
The first step in reaching speech on the Internet is obtaining access through a service 
provider.9  Next, the user’s computer is linked to that of the provider through a 
modem.10  Once logged on, users may access various methods of communication such 
as e-mail,11 electronic bulletin boards,12 or the world wide web.13  The world wide web 
                                                                                                                         
MINN. L. REV. 609, 615 and n. 13 (1998) (describing the origins of the Internet and noting how 
the Department of Defense wanted to make computer communication available between 
government-funded researchers and the government, regardless of their geographic location 
and the type of machine being used). 
5  Id. at 615 and n.14; John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 
38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 207, 218 n.59 (1997) (discussing how the United States Department of 
Defense developed the Internet in an effort to maintain communications during war time). 
6  See, e.g., GRAHAM J.H. SMITH, INTERNET  LAW AND REGULATION 1 (2nd ed. 1997); ACLU v. 
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) [hereinafter Reno I]; Lesli 
C. Esposito, Note, Regulating the Internet: The New Battle Against Child Pornography, 30 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 541, 548-49 (1998) (discussing the history of the Internet, examining 
the regulation of child pornography on the Internet, and concluding an international structure 
of regulation and enforcement is necessary for successful regulation). 
7  SMITH, supra  note 6, at 3.  Routers are computers designed to receive and forward data.  
Id. 
8  Id. at 1-3 (describing an overview of the Internet); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and 
Innovation in the Global Information Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 286 (1996).  
This system enables anyone with a computer and a modem to connect the computer to the 
telephone line and communicate with anyone also connected in the same way. O’Rourke, 
supra  note 4, at 616.  Generally, this communication consists of sharing information directly 
with other users, as well as posting and retrieving information made available by other users.  
Kimberly A. Gobla, Comment, The Infeasibility of Federal Internet Regulation: The Online 
Parental Control Act of 1996 -- A Reaction to the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 
102 DICK. L. REV. 93, 96 (1997). 
9  TRACY LAQUEY, THE INTERNET  COMPANION:  A BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL 
NETWORKING 113 (2nd ed. 1994) (noting that a service provider offers access to the Internet 
and can be a company or an individual); SMITH, supra  note 6, at 9-10 (stating a typical service 
provider is a commercial organization that sells Internet access to commercial and home users 
and offers a variety of services such as web site hosting and design and software 
distribution). 
10  Eric Handelman, Comment, Obscenity and the Internet: Does the Current Obscenity 
Standard Provide Individuals with the Proper Constitutional Safeguards? , 59 ALB. L. REV. 
709, 711 (1995) (describing how pornographic images are transmitted over the Internet and 
how finding an Internet service, such as a bulletin board service (BBS), is like a database like 
Westlaw or LEXIS because users can retrieve information from the BBS, but it is also different 
in that users can leave information on the BBS for other users). 
11  E-mail is similar to traditional paper mail in that it allows correspondence to take place.  
Joseph N. Campolo, Note, Childporn.Gif: Establishing Liability for On-Line Service 
Providers, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 721, 739 (1996).  However, an 
individual may instantly respond to, store, or delete an e-mail.  Id. at 740.  Additionally, it 
allows messages to be sent to large mailing lists with just a few keystrokes.  Id. 
2
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is the most popular method of communication because it is easy to use.14  Users may 
access and transmit pictures, videos, sound and text on the web.15   
 
Every document on the web has a unique address called a Uniform Resource 
Locator (URL)16 and the documents are stored on servers throughout the world.17  Any 
user can create a “home page” with his own URL, so others may access the web site.18 
 The content of these web sites and documents may contain sexually explicit material 
and other material harmful to children.19  This troubles many parents because of the 
accessibility of those images by “pointing-and-clicking” with the computer mouse,20 a 
task simple enough for a small child to perform. 
 
Internet growth has been drastic in the last decade.  The number of computers that 
store information and relay communications, also known as host computers, has risen 
from approximately 300 in 1981, to 36,739,000 in 1998.21  In 1992, the estimated range 
of Internet users was ten to twenty-five million.22  In 1998, 157 million people had 
access worldwide, according to estimates, and the projected number for the end of 
2000 is 327 million.23  In the United States alone, 70.5 million (34.9%) of approximately 
202 million adults currently use the Internet.24 
                                                                                                                         
12  There are approximately 5,000 newsgroups on the Internet and each is focused on an 
area of particular interest where users with that interest can read and respond to messages.  
Robert F. Goldman, Note, Put Another Log on the Fire, There’s a Chill on the Internet: The 
Effect of Applying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online Communications, 29 GA. L. REV. 
1075, 1086 (1995).  Some newsgroups are devoted to sex and/or pornography. Id. at 1086-87.  
Electronic bulletin boards (EBBs) are similar to electronic town meetings.  Campolo, supra  
note 11, at 741.  A user picks a board, reads the messages, and replies.  Id.  EEBs are located 
primarily on the Internet. Id.  
13  The world wide web enables users to access the hard drive of others.  Goldman, supra 
note 12, at 1088.  Users may access text, images, recordings, and video images posted on the 
Web.  Id.; see also  Angela E. Wu, Comment, Spinning a Tighter Web: The First Amendment 
and Internet Regulation, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 263, 269 (1997) (describing the most common 
means of communication over the Internet, including one-to-one messaging, one-to-many 
messaging, distributed message databases real time communication, and remote information 
retrieval). 
14  Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
15  Id. at 834. 
16  Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997). 
17  Id. 
18  Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 836-37. 
19  James V. Dobeus, Comment, Rating Internet Content and the Spectre of Government 
Regulation, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 625, 631 (1998); Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 
844; see generally Jamie N. Nafziger, Time To Pay Up: Internet Service Providers’ Universal 
Service Obligations Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 16 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 37 (1997) (discussing the efforts of the FCC to assert jurisdiction over 
the Internet). 
20  Goldman, supra  note 12, at 1083. 
21  Mark K. Lottor, Network Wizards Internet Domain Survey (visited Oct. 15, 1998) 
<http://www.nw.com/zone/host-count-history>. 
22  Randolph Stuart Sergent, The “Hamlet” Fallacy: Computer Networks and the 
Geographic Roots of Obscenity Regulation, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 671, 672 (1996) 
(providing statistics on the Internet’s rapid growth and discussing how the Internet has 
changed the way the world communicates due to its ability to relay communication 
instantaneously). 
23  Global Internet Statistics (visited Oct. 15, 1998) 
3
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A recent example of the increased use and technological achievement of the Internet 
is the release of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s report to Congress on the alleged 
relationship between President Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky.  The government 
voted to release the 445-page report to the public via the Internet on September 11, 
1998, and in a matter of hours the full text was available online.25  The traffic of 
millions of people attempting to download the document overwhelmed parts of the 
Internet.  For example, the number of users accessing the CNN web site was more 
than 300,000 per minute before the report was even available online.26  That number 
peaked at 340,000, breaking the record set August 31, 1998 set when the stock market 
average plunged.27  On the afternoon the government released the report, only one in 
ten attempts to access the House of Representatives’ web site succeeded.28  The 
slowdown was felt all across the Internet.29  According to one source,  
 
[t]o longtime Internet watchers, the real news about the release of the Starr report 
was the use of the global network as the primary means of distributing unfiltered, 
primary news to millions of Americans.  ‘This is an historic event . . . [which] shows 
that the net is making an impact on our nation’s democracy.’30 
 
While the ability to regulate the increased number of Internet users is a concern to 
the government, the real issue for both Congress and parents is what material is made 
available via the Internet and how it may affect children.31  Approximately one-fifth of 
                                                                                                                         
<http://www.euromktg.com/globstats/>.  
24  USA Today Tech Report (visited Oct. 15, 1998) 
<http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/ctd392.htm>.  
25  Darnell Little and Kelly McEvers, A Wide Net Casts for Starr Report, (visited Sept. 11, 
1998) <http://chicagotribune.com/news/ nationworld/wsitem/0,1267,2899-2938-14399,00.html>. 
 Congress posted the report on four of the government web sites and gave copies to the top 
commercial news sites.  Id.  Aaron Pressman (Reuters), Internet Withstands Crush of Starr 
Report Seekers (visited Sept. 11, 1998) 
<http://dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/p1/story.html?s-v/nm/19980911/p1/internet_3.html>.  
Yahoo!, an Internet search engine, was one of the first web sites to publish the report.  Little 
& McEvers, supra .  It uploaded the document from the House of Representatives at 1:45 p.m. 
CST and five minutes later it was available on the web.  Id. 
26  Chris Allbritton, Millions Swamp Internet for Report (visited Sept. 11, 1998) 
<http://dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/ ap/washington/story.html?s-
v/ap980911/washington/stories/clinton_internet_1.html>. 
27  Pressman, supra  note 25.  
28  Id. 
29  Allbritton, supra  note 26.  
30  Pressman, supra  note 25 (quoting Internet political consultant and co-founder of 
Mindshare Internet Campaigns, Jonah Seiger).  But see Murray Fromson, Online Journalism 
Review: Triumph for the Internet, Tragedy for the Country? (visited Sept. 11, 1998) 
<http://orj.usc.edu/sections/news/98_stories/ ojrnews_fromson_ 091198.htm> (“The Internet 
speed of news delivery is unquestionably a technological achievement, but the hasty flashing 
of raw and salacious data to an eagerly awaiting world market may prove tragic.”). 
31  Brian M. Werst, Comment, A Survey of the First Amendment “Indecency” Legal 
Doctrine and Its Inapplicability to Internet Regulation: A Guide for Protecting Children 
from Internet Indecency After Reno v. ACLU, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 207, 208 (1998) (arguing the 
nature of the Internet and the goal of protecting children does not warrant regulating the 
Internet because there is very little chance that children will accidentally access indecent 
material on the Internet, and concluding that because of the global nature of the Internet, 
Congress may need to find an international answer or rely on the parents to monitor their 
4
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users of the world wide web regularly view at least one of the over six hundred 
available commercial pornography sites, and the number of these sites increases daily 
by thirty-nine.32  The Internet is an easy avenue for the distribution of pornography due 
to the anonymity of the distributor and receiver through the use of passwords.33  Much 
of the illegal Internet pornographic material is encrypted and law enforcement cannot 
access the content of such material without the passwords, which are available only 
from the sender or receiver.34  Another concern is the relative simplicity of viewing 
pornography online for a person of any age with only modest experience.35  Because 
there are many adult bulletin board services36 on the web, access to free pornographic 
images only requires a mouse click on a button labeled “yes” when a person is 
presented with the question, “Are you 18 years of age or older?”37   
 
A recent case showing the impact of easy access and exchange of harmful material 
to children involves forty-two year-old Francis Kufrovich of Woodland Hills, 
California.38  Kufrovich used the Internet to attempt to lure a thirteen year-old 
Connecticut girl into having sex with him.39  When he first contacted the girl on the 
                                                                                                                         
children’s access). 
32  Id. at 208; see also  Sara Silver, Sex Sells Briskly in Cyberspace, Creating Lucrative 
New Industry with Internet as Gateway to Private-Site Peep Shows, Porn May Again Take 
Lead in Spurring New Technology, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, June 18, 1997, at C7 (describing 
the Internet sex oriented business developed by Madeleine Altmann in New York City). 
33  Marc S. Friedman and Kristin Bissinger, “Infojacking”: Crimes on the Information 
Super Highway, 9 No. 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. May, 1997, at 2, 9 (stating that America Online 
now offers a “kids-only” chat room because pornography is prevalent on the Internet).  
Another problem with anonymity on the Internet stems from the use of “anonymous 
remailers.”  Id. at 8.  Some pedophiles utilize remailers to re-send email messages using a 
fictitious origin.  Id.  Children who receive such emails have no way of knowing if the sender 
is a friend or a child abuser.  Id. at 8-9. 
34  Id. at 9 (discussing how both the sender and receiver of encrypted pornographic 
material remain anonymous and the only effective way for authorities to infiltrate this type of 
situation is an expensive and time-consuming investigation). 
35  Anthony L. Clapes, The Wages of Sin: Pornography and Internet Providers, 
COMPUTER LAW, July 1996, at 1, 2  (finding the technology industry should be responsible to 
find a solution to protect children from online pornography, rather than parents, because 
parents are less “net-savvy” then their children). 
36  For information on bulletin board services (BBSs) and electronic bulletin boards (EBBs), 
see supra  note 12 and accompanying text. 
37  Clapes, supra  note 35, at 2-3. 
38  Valley Man Faces Net Sex Charge, DAILY NEWS OF LOS ANGELES, July 24, 1997, at N1, 
available in Westlaw, PAPERS File; see also  Robyn Forman Pollack, Creating the Standards 
of a Global Community: Regulating Pornography on the Internet -- An International 
Concern , 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 467, 478-79 (1996) (discussing other recent cases 
involving children being lured away from their homes and molested by computer pedophiles, 
and how technology needs to “catch-up” with the legal difficulties created by the Internet; 
concluding that because the Internet is a global medium, regulation must be agreed upon 
internationally, which includes reconciling legal venue and jurisdiction). 
39  Valley Man Faces Net Sex Charge, supra  note 38, at N1. 
5
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Internet he pretended to be a teenager.40  Kufrovich allegedly tried to sexually assault 
the young girl after meeting her in person.41 
 
There was also the case of forty-seven year-old Paul Brown, Jr. of Cleveland, 
Ohio.42  Brown used the Internet to entice female minors to send him sexually explicit 
videos and pictures of themselves and to engage in sexual conduct.43  Police found 
letters and photographs from fifteen girls, ages fourteen to sixteen, in his apartment.44  
Authorities released Brown’s home and e-mail address in hopes of identifying other 
victims.45 
   
In another incident, a former high-school vice principal pleaded guilty to using the 
Internet to lure teenage boys into having sexual relations with him.46  Lewis Powell, 
fifty-six, admitted he used the Internet to talk to minors about “sexual fantasy stuff.”47 
 
A recent poll found that indecency on the Internet was a concern of eighty-five 
percent of Americans.48  However, there are two characteristics which make regulating 
the Internet very difficult, its decentralization and openness.49  Simply stated, “[n]o one 
                                                 
40  Id.; see also  Mike McPhee, Oregon Man Held in Internet Sex Sting, DENVER POST, Feb. 
14, 1998, at B-03, available in Westlaw, PAPERS File (discussing the indictment of Steven 
Tubbs, forty-two, who entered a chat room established for teenagers in order to contact “a 
teen romate (sic) for cleaning and various personal services”). 
41  Valley Man Faces Net Sex Charge, supra  note 38, at N1.   Kufrovich traveled to Irving, 
Texas, where the girl went with her mother for a swim meet.  Id.  The mother intervened in the 
assault.  Id. 
42  Prosecutors Seek Victims in Internet Sex Scandal, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 21, 
1997, at 3A, available in Westlaw, PAPERS File. 
43  Id.  Brown faces up to ten years in prison, as well as a $250,000 fine.  Id. 
44  Id.  Police also found pictures of ten girls with only their first names written on the back. 
 Id.; see also  Police Close Case About Internet Sex, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Sept. 16, 1998, 
at B4, available in Westlaw, PAPERS File (noting the police seized and searched a suspect’s 
computer and software to determine if a crime was committed after the police caught him in an 
undercover operation where a detective posed as a fourteen year-old girl in a chatroom). 
45  Prosecutors seek  victims, supra  note 42, at 3A.  A U.S. Attorney urged parents to 
check phone bills for calls to Brown’s telephone number.  Id.  Brown had six online accounts 
and numerous e-mail addresses.  Id. 
46  Former Vice-Principal Pleads Guilty to Internet Sex Charge, LEDGER-ENQUIRER, Jan. 
13, 1998, at B2, available in Westlaw PAPERS File. 
47  Id. 
48  Werst, supra  note 31, at 209 (finding Internet pornography is the third largest area of 
sales on the Internet with an estimated annual revenue of $100 million, and noting that many 
adult Internet sites are accessed more than two million times in a one-month period). 
In particular, the increased availability of indecency on the Internet has 
generated a serious concern for children. The scores of amicus curiae that 
participated in Internet regulation litigation pointed to the resulting harm to 
children from exposure to sexual content on the Internet. Many of these parties 
also argued that increased availability of pornography affects not only children, 
but also the sexual attitudes of American adults. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Compare Peter Johnson, Pornography Drives Technology: Why Not 
to Censor The Internet, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 217, 218 (1996) (stating pornography is a “positive 
good” that not only encourages experimentation with various forms of new media, but has 
economic value as well). 
49  O’Rourke, supra  note 4, at 617 (discussing how the Internet was designed so that if one 
link in the network was broken there would be no disruption to the communication, and 
6
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owns the Internet, thus no one controls it.”50  It is open to anyone with a computer and 
modem,51 unbounded by geographical barriers, and its content “is as diverse as human 
thought.”52  Therefore, controlling the content of the Internet is extremely difficult 
because no one knows where the material originates, who is receiving the material, or if 
it has crossed international boundaries.53  
 
B.  First Amendment Protection for Content-Based Regulations 
 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”54  However, the Constitution does 
not protect all forms of speech.55  Obscene material does not receive any First 
Amendment protection.56  Indecent speech, on the other hand, is constitutionally 
protected and subject to strict scrutiny.57  This means that in order for a regulation to 
survive strict scrutiny “the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”58  The strict 
                                                                                                                         
noting there is no organization responsible for regulating the Internet). 
50  Pollack, supra  note 38, at 467 (finding the Internet’s unique characteristics, including 
the fact that it is unbounded, make it impractical to use existing laws to regulate Internet 
content). “ ‘Almost like posters on telephone poles, the Internet appears to defy regulation.’” 
Id. (quoting Warren Caragata, Crime in Cybercity, MACLEAN’S, May 22, 1995, at 50). 
51  O’Rourke, supra  note 4, at 618 (noting the decentralization of the Internet is responsible 
for its openness, as anyone with a personal computer and modem can connect to a computer 
already linked in, and get access to the Internet). 
52  Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  Chief Judge 
Dolores Sloviter of the Court of Appeals  for the Third Circuit found regulation and 
enforcement of the Internet was technologically impossible. Id. at 854; see generally 
Lawrence Lessig, Reading The Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996) 
(presenting the two arguments on how courts are to apply the Constitution to advanced 
technology such as the Internet: (1) courts should be deferential for the time being to allow 
ordinary understandings to catch up to technology; (2) courts should actively respond to the 
Internet to protect citizens’ rights from being violated by increasing government 
intervention). 
53  Pollack, supra  note 38, at 468. 
54  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The full text of the First Amendment is: “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  Id. 
55  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-46 (1974) (finding libelous statements 
against private citizens receive less First Amendment protection than libelous statements 
directed toward public figures); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (holding obscene 
speech receives no First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
571-72 (1942) (finding under the First Amendment the government may forbid speech that 
constitutes fighting words). 
56  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
57  Sable Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 
U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (holding that just because protected speech may offend some people, it 
does not justify suppression). 
58  Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987); see also Samantha 
L. Friel, Porn by Any Other Name? A Constitutional Alternative to Regulating “Victimless” 
Computer-Generated Child Pornography, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 207, 234 (1997) (discussing 
strict scrutiny and its application to computer generated child pornography that does not 
involve child abuse, and concluding there should be a rebuttable presumption established 
under federal law that a photograph that looks like a child engaging in sexual activity is child 
7
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scrutiny standard is applied to any government legislation that limits the content of 
protected speech.59  The following section provides an overview of the law relating to 
obscene and indecent material. 
 
1.  Obscenity Law 
 
In 1868, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn established the first obscenity test in Regina 
v. Hicklin,60 which involved a pamphlet describing the alleged immorality of Catholic 
Priests.  The Chief Justice defined the test as “[w]hether the tendency of the matter 
charged . . . is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral 
influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.”61  The American 
courts adopted that test until it came under great criticism.62  This led the Supreme 
Court to adopt a different test in Roth v. United States.63  There, the Court established 
that obscene material is not constitutionally protected by the First Amendment64 and 
defined the obscenity test as “whether to the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to 
purient interest.”65  However, courts struggled to apply the Roth standard and 
numerous opinions found the issue was unsettled.66 
 
In Miller v. California,67 the Supreme Court created the current obscenity test and 
reaffirmed that obscene material is not constitutionally protected.68  The new three-part 
standard is:   
 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” 
would find that the work, when taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
                                                                                                                         
pornography).  
59  Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York, 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991). 
60  United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (citing L.R.-Q.B. 361 (Eng. 
1868)). 
61  Id. 
62  Kennerley, 209 F. at 120-21 (Judge Learned Hand found the Hicklin test to be unduly 
harsh because he believed it did not reflect the understanding and morality of the time); 
United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (rejecting 
the Hicklin test and suggesting a pornographic intent standard with a determination of the 
effect on an average reader). 
63  354 U.S. 476 (1957).  In Roth, the Court convicted the defendant of mailing obscene 
books, photos and advertisements.  Id. at 480. 
64  Id. at 484-85. 
65  Id. at 489. 
66  Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur 
efforts to implement . . . [the Roth standard] demonstrate that agreement on the existence of 
something called ‘obscenity’ is still a long and painful step from agreement on a workable 
definition of the term.”); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 676, 704-05 (1968) (Harlan, J., separate 
opinion) (finding the Roth approach has “produced a variety of views among the members of 
the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication”).  
67  413 U.S. 15 (1973).  In Miller, the Court affirmed the conviction of the defendant for 
conducting a mass mailing which advertised the sale of adult material.  Id. at 16.  The 
brochures contained explicit drawings of men and women in groups of two or more engaged 
in sexual activities.  Id. at 18.  
68  Id. at 23. 
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specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.69 
 
Significantly, the Court recognized that “[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally 
sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi 
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.”70  
Therefore, the test incorporated a community standard, as opposed to a “national” 
standard.71 
 
In Ginsberg v. New York,72 the Court employed a slightly different application of 
obscenity law toward children.  The Ginsberg Court affirmed the conviction of a 
defendant who distributed material considered “harmful to minors” to children under 
age seventeen.73  The Court found that the State has a compelling interest in protecting 
the welfare of children.74  It held that the State could bar the distribution of obscene 
                                                 
69  Donald T. Stepka, Obscenity On-Line: A Transactional Approach to Computer 
Transfers of Potentially Obscene Material, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 917 (1997) (summarizing 
the test from Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).  The test described in layman’s 
terms is as follows: 
[T]he trial court would ask something like these four questions: 
Error! Main Document Only..  Is it designed to be sexually arousing? 
Error! Main Document Only..  Is it arousing in a way that one’s local 
community would consider unhealthy or immoral? 
Error! Main Document Only..  Does it depict acts whose depictions are 
specifically prohibited by state law? 
Error! Main Document Only..  Does the work, when taken as a whole, lack 
significant literary, artistic, scientific, or social value? 
If the answer to all four questions is “yes,” the material will be judged obscene, and it will 
be constitutional to prosecute someone for distributing it. 
Mike Godwin, Virtual Community Standards: BBS Obscenity Case Raises New Legal Issues, 
in HIGH NOON ON THE ELECTRONIC  FRONTIER, CONCEPTUAL ISSUES  IN CYBERSPACE 269, 271 
(Peter Ludlow ed., 1996). 
70  Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.    
71  Id. at 37.  For a discussion on the application of the community standard to the Internet, 
see infra Part III.B. 
72  390 U.S. 629 (1968).  In Ginsberg , the Court found a minor’s constitutional right to 
freedom of expression was not invaded by the New York statute which gave minors under age 
seventeen more restricted rights than adults, as applied to what sexual material they could 
see.  Id. at 636-37.  Specifically, the Court concluded that magazines with pictures of female 
nudity are not obscene for adults, but are obscene as applied to minors under age seventeen. 
 Id. at 634-65.  
73  Id. at 632.  The defendant owned a lunch counter.  Id. at 631.  He personally sold two 
“girlie” magazines to a 16 year-old boy.  Id.  The New York statute in question defined 
“harmful to minors” as the  
quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual 
conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it: (i) predominantly 
appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently 
offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to 
what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social 
importance for minors. 
Id. at 646 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h, later replace by §§ 235.20-235.22 (McKinney 
1998)).   
74  Id. at 640-41.  The Court based its finding of a compelling interest on two reasons.  Id. at 
639.  First, the Court found that parents have the authority in the household in our society 
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material to children, even though it would not qualify as obscene when distributed to 
adults.75  Although the protection of children qualifies as a compelling government 
interest, a regulation designed to achieve this goal must be narrowly tailored or the least 
restric tive means available to survive the strict scrutiny standard.76 
 
2.  Indecency Law  
 
Short of obscenity, indecent speech is constitutionally protected, but it may be 
regulated if the content is offensive to a compelling state interest.77  Indecent material 
includes offensive sexual expression which is not obscene when distributed to adults, as 
determined by the Miller obscenity test.78  The cornerstone case for the regulation of 
indecent speech is FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,79 which involved a radio station 
broadcast of comedian George Carlin’s monologue entitled “Filthy Words.”80  The FCC 
concluded the language used in the broadcast was indecent and violated 18 U.S.C. 
§1464,81 because certain words depicted excretory and sexual activities in an offensive 
manner.82  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found that the statutory terms 
“obscene,” “indecent,” and “profane” had independent meanings.83  He went on to 
adopt the FCC’s definition of the term “indecent.”84  The FCC defines broadcast 
indecency as “language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs.”85  The Court found that 
                                                                                                                         
and “are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.”  Id.  
Second, it found “[t]he State also has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth.”  
Id. at 640. 
75  Id. at 638.  But see Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (holding the State could 
not totally suppress the material harmful to minors based on the state interest in protecting 
children to such exposure because it would “reduce the adult population . . . to reading only 
what is fit for children”). 
76  See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (describing the strict scrutiny standard 
and its application to content-based regulations);  Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997) 
[hereinafter Reno II]. 
77  Recent Development, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union: Supreme Court Strikes 
Down Portions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 as Facially Overbroad in 
Violation of the First Amendment, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 111, 121 (1998) (discussing the 
background of the First Amendment and finding free speech guarantees remain constant 
even though communication mediums continually change). 
78  Sable Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
79  438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
80  Id. at 729-30. 
81  The statute states, “[W]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by 
means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two 
years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. §1464 (1994). 
82  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739. 
83  Id. at 739-40. 
84  Clapes, supra  note 35, at 5 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743, and discussing First 
Amendment law terminology, including the history of the terms “indecent” and “patently 
offensive,” and concluding because the Internet is so difficult to regulate through legislation, 
the information technology industry needs to step forward and accept its responsibility to 
protect children from the technology it brought into people’s homes). 
85  Clapes, supra  note 35, at 5 (quoting In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against 
Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704, 705 n.10 (1993)). 
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the FCC properly held the broadcast indecent and in violation of the statute because the 
broadcast content was offensive and shocking.86 
 
C.  Medium-Specific First Amendment Analysis 
 
The Court treats forms of communicative technology differently when applying First 
Amendment standards because of the different characteristics of each medium.87  For 
example, in Pacifica, the Court justified the application of a reduced level of scrutiny to 
a radio broadcast due to distinct characteristics of the broadcast medium: (1) radio and 
television are easily accessible by children; (2) broadcasting invades the privacy of 
people’s homes and creates a constant risk of exposure to offensive broadcasts 
(pervasive nature); and (3) the government must regulate the limited supply of 
frequency space (scarcity of frequencies).88   
 
The scarcity of frequencies argument originally surfaced in the case of Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.89  The Court concluded that because there are a limited 
number of broadcasting frequencies, the government should manage them to best serve 
                                                 
86  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 727. 
87  Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).  One example is print media, 
where a print publisher may be a primary publisher and liable for the contents of its 
publication, like a newspaper, if the publisher played a major part in creating and editing the 
illegal communication.  Campolo, supra  note 11, at 747 (analogizing print publisher liability to 
that of an electronic information service (EIS) or an Internet service provider and finding if the 
EIS has reason to know the obscene or indecent material is posted on its service it is legally 
obligated to remedy it).  The alternative classification is that of a republisher where there is no 
presumption of knowledge of the illegal material, like a bookstore.  Id.  Traditionally, print 
media has been free from government regulation.  The Message in the Medium: The First 
Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1071 (1994).  In Smith 
v. California, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of publisher liability and determined 
that booksellers were republishers and could not be held strictly liable for the contents of the 
published material they sold.  361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959).   Recently, some courts found Internet 
service providers were republishers, while others classified them as primary publishers.  E.g. 
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding CompuServe’s 
status was a republisher because it had no editorial control over material posted on its service 
and because of the infeasibility of examining all the material on its service); Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) 
(holding Prodigy was a primary publisher responsible for member postings because Prodigy 
held itself out as maintaining editorial control over material postings on its service, like a 
newspaper); see generally Jennifer J. Lee, The Internet and First Amendment Values: Reno v. 
ACLU and the Democratization of Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. 
& ARTS 61 (1997) (finding the Internet is different from any traditional form of 
communications media, but concluding the Internet is closest to telephone communication 
because an Internet user must affirmatively search for information, like a caller placing a 
telephone call). 
88  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731 n.2; Recent Development, supra  note 77, at 123 (describing the 
Pacifica decision in which the Court upheld the FCC’s authority to sanction broadcasters for 
transmitting indecent speech and finding broadcasting was “uniquely accessible to children,” 
as well as a “uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans”). 
89  395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969).  In Red Lion, the Court held it was constitutional to regulate 
broadcast media mo re strictly than other media because broadcast channels were a scarce 
public resource.  Id.  The Court noted that the radio broadcast spectrum had become very 
congested.  Id. at 398.  The government’s job was to properly allocate the scarce broadcast 
frequencies so as to best serve the public interest.  Id. at 396. 
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the public interest.90  In sum, the government may not regulate the content of 
objectionable material where individuals have control over its dissemination.91 
 
The Court addressed the telephonic medium in Sable Communications, Inc. v. 
FCC,92 where a dial-a-porn service challenged § 223(b) of the 1988 version of the 
Telecommunications Act, which banned the transmission of obscene or indecent 
commercial phone recordings.93  The Supreme Court held that the portion of the statute 
banning obscene communications was constitutional, as obscenity is not protected by 
the First Amendment.94  However, the Court found that the “dial-it-medium” was less 
pervasive than the broadcast medium in Pacifica because a caller must take affirmative 
steps to receive a dial-a-porn message.95  Therefore, in terms of the ban on indecent 
communication, the Court analyzed telephonic communication under the strict scrutiny 
standard.96  While the Court acknowledged that protecting the well-being of minors is a 
compelling government interest,97 it found that alternatives existed that were less 
restrictive than a complete ban on indecent speech, which would deny adult access.98 
 
The Supreme Court provided a lesser First Amendment protection to cable television 
because, like broadcasts, cable is accessible to children and has a potentially pervasive 
presence in a viewer’s home.99  However, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
                                                 
90  Id. at 400.  The right at issue was that of the viewers or listeners and not the 
broadcasters.  Id. at 390. 
91  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997); Sean Adam Shiff, Comment, The Good, the Bad 
and the Ugly: Criminal Liability for Obscene and Indecent Speech on the Internet, 22 WM. 
MITCHELL L. R. 731, 753 (1996) (arguing the Court should re-examine the Miller obscenity 
standard and allow obscenity to receive First Amendment protection and only be suppressed 
when the government has a compelling interest to do so).  The author argued: 
[T]he ultimate issue for sexually-explicit content on the Internet would be whether 
users could adequately control the content appearing on their screen, as well as 
what their children could access.  If technology advances to the point where 
exposure to all unwanted material could be thwarted, then the government would no 
longer have a compelling interest in suppression. 
Id. at 765. 
92  492 U.S. 115 (1989).  In Sable, the Court struck down a statute designed to prohibit 
minors from accessing telephone dial-a-porn because the statute was not narrowly tailored to 
meet the government purpose of protecting minors.  Id. at 130-31. 
93  47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1982); Sable, 492 U.S. at 117-19.  A dial-a-porn service is where 
individuals use the telephone to access and listen to obscene or indecent recordings for a fee. 
 Id. at 118; Congress began to regulate dial-a-porn in the 1980’s in an attempt to protect 
children from the harmful effects of pornography.  Wu, supra  note 13, at 280. 
94  Sable, 492 U.S. at 124.  The Court held that it was a constitutional violation to deny 
adult access to indecent communication over the telephone.  Id. at 131. 
95  Id. at 127-28. 
96  Id. at 126.  The Court found “sexual expression” that is indecent, but not obscene, is 
protected by the First Amendment.  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 131.  “The Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected 
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to 
further the articulated interest.”  Id. at 126. 
99  Werst, supra  note 31, at 221; Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 
518 U.S. 727, 745, 2386-87 (1996) (holding cable television is as pervasive and accessible to 
children as broadcast media).  But see Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(holding cable television is not pervasive because individuals decide whether to have cable 
installed in their homes and noting that parents may obtain lockboxes from their cable 
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FCC,100 the Court found that the Red Lion “scarcity of frequency” rationale did not 
apply to cable television, and the Court affirmed the application of strict scrutiny or 
something very close to strict scrutiny for content-based government regulations.101   
 
Later, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,102 
the Court struck down two provisions of the 1992 Cable Act, that imposed heavy 
regulations on the cable industry.103  One provision of the 1992 Cable Act allowed cable 
services the power to prohibit indecent programs on public channels.104  The other 
provision was the “segregate and block” provision which the Court found violated the 
First Amendment because it allowed cable services to regulate the content of their 
service.105  The holding reflects the view that the First Amendment is consistent with 
the promotion of diversity of speech.106  
 
D.  The Communications Decency Act of 1996: The First Round 
 
1. Legislative History 
 
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to encourage development 
and reduce regulation of new telecommunications technologies.107  Title V of this Act 
includes the Communications Decency Act (CDA),108 which was an amendment 
proposed by Senator James Exon (D-Neb.) in an effort to make the Internet 
“superhighway a safe place for our children and our families to travel on.”109  
                                                                                                                         
company to prohibit child access to certain channels); Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 876 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (Dalzell, J.,) aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Dawn L. Johnson, It’s 1996: Do You Know Where 
Your Cyberkids Are? Captive Audiences and Content Regulation on the Internet, 15 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 51, 68 (1996). 
100  512 U.S. 622 (1994), aff’d, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).  In Turner, a group of cable operators 
challenged the 1992 Cable Act. Id. at 634.  The Act imposed rate regulations, must-carry 
provisions, and restrictions on the distribution of indecent programs.  Wu, supra  note 13, at 
278 (discussing the regulation within the cable industry and how the 1992 Cable Act 
converted the cable industry from virtually unregulated to heavily regulated).  The Court held 
the must-carry provisions supported the important governmental interest of making free 
television available and guaranteeing that a key part of the United States’ communication 
system remains intact.  Turner, 512 U.S. at 646-47. 
101  Turner, 512 U.S. at 637-38, 641-42; The Court ultimately applied intermediate scrutiny in 
Turner because it determined the provisions in question were content-neutral.  Id. at 661-62. 
102  518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
103  Id. at 733 (citing Cable Televis ion Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-555 (1994)). 
104  Id. at 732; see also Wu, supra  note 13, at 276-80 (noting cable television is like 
broadcasting in that the transmission is one-way, but unlike broadcasting because cable 
subscribers may select a particular cable plan to receive in their home, while with 
broadcasting the viewer receives what the broadcaster transmits). 
105  Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 733; Wu, supra note 13, at 
279. 
106  Wu, supra  note 13, at 279-80 (discussing the historical regulation of cable television 
and concluding that regulation of the Internet will halt the free and effective exchange of 
ideas for which the Internet was created). 
107  Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56  (codified at 47 
U.S.C. §§ 151-641 (Supp. 1996)). 
108  Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a)-(h) (Supp. 1996)). 
109  141 CONG. REC. S8087-04 (June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon); see also  141 CONG 
REC. S1920 (Feb. 1, 1995) (introducing the CDA); 141 CONG. REC. S1820 (June 9, 1995); 141 
13
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The explicit purpose of the CDA was to shield children from indecent material on the 
Internet.110 The indecency portions of the Act made it a criminal violation to use a 
computer to transmit any “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent 
[communications], with [the] intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another 
person.”111  It also criminalized the computer transmission of any obscene or indecent 
communication if the party sending the material knew the recipient was under the age 
of eighteen, regardless of whom initiated the communication.112   
 
Next, the CDA made it a criminal violation to use a computer to transmit a 
communication to a specific minor that depicted or described sexual or excretory 
activities or organs in terms that are patently offensive according to contemporary 
community standards, no matter whom initiated the communication,113 or to transmit 
the communication in such a way that it would be accessible to anyone under eighteen 
years old.114 
 
2.  A Challenge to the CDA 
 
On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act into law 
and on the same day various groups advocating the First Amendment right to free 
speech moved for a temporary restraining order in the Federal District Court of the 
Central District of Pennsylvania to enjoin enforcement of the indecency portion of the 
CDA.115  Proponents of the regulation, including the federal government and advocates 
of family rights, argued that the law protected children from objectionable content being 
readily available on-line.116  Opponents, such as free speech advocates and the 
computer technology industry, argued that any legislation restricting the content of the 
Internet infringed upon adults’ right to free speech.117  The three-judge panel granted 
                                                                                                                         
CONG. REC. S8386-02 (June 14, 1995) (proposing two amendments to the proposed regulation).  
110  Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 502, 110 Stat. 56.  The CDA was 
an update of the Communications Act of 1934, which regulated telephone technology.  See 47 
U.S.C. § 609 (Supp. 1996).  
111  47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1996).  
112  § 223(a)(1)(B).  
113  § 223(d)(1)(A).  
114  § 223(d)(1)(B). 
115  Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 826-27 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); plaintiffs 
included the American Civil Liberties Union, AIDS Education Global Information System, 
Bibliobytes, Clarinet Communications Corp., Computer Professionals for Social 
Responsibility, Critical Path AIDS Project, Inc., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, Human Rights Watch, Institute for Global Communications, 
Journalism Education Association, National Writers Union, Queer Resources Directory, Stop 
Prisoner Rape, Wildcat Press Inc., Declan McCullagh, John Troyer, Brock Meeks, Jonathan 
Wallace, and Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.  Id. at 827 n.2. 
116  C. Richard Martin, Censorship in Cyberspace, 34 HOUS. LAW. 45, 47 (1996); see also  
Brief filed by Dept. of Justice in ACLU v. Reno, in TAKING SIDES, CLASHING VIEWS ON 
CONTROVERSIAL LEGAL ISSUES , 201, 201-04 (M. Ethan Katsh ed., 7th ed. 1996). 
117  Werst, supra  note 31, at 212; see generally Bret Alan Dublinske, Free Speech, the 
Internet, and The CDA: Is a “Decent” Opinion Just a Dream? , 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1229 
(1997) (discussing the CDA and concluding it is unconstitutional because it impairs a 
significant amount of constitutionally protected adult speech); Laura J. McKay, The 
Communications Decency Act: Protecting Children From On-Line Indecency, 20 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 463 (1996) (discussing the CDA and its First Amendment issues). 
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the order, finding the provisions in question were unconstitutional because they were 
overbroad and vague in the use of the terms “indecent” and “patently offensive.”118 
 
3.  The United States Supreme Court Decision 
 
In Reno v. ACLU,119 the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s holding in a 7-
2 decision and invalidated the CDA indecency provisions of 47 U.S.C. §223(a) and 
223(d).120  The Court found that the statute lacked the precision required under the 
First Amendment to regulate speech content.121  The decision also affirmed the district 
court’s holding of vagueness and overbreadth.122 
 
The government argued that the CDA was constitutional, based on previous cases in 
which the Court upheld government regulations designed to protect minors from speech 
that was not obscene by adult standards.123  This line of precedent included Ginsberg v. 
New York,124 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,125 and City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 
                                                 
118  Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 855.  The statute provided for review by a district court three-
judge panel, with direct appeal to the Supreme Court.  Werst, supra  note 31, at 212.  The 
judges in the district court were Chief Judge Dolores K. Sloviter, Chief Judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, District Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter and District 
Judge Stewart Dalzell.  Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 827. 
119  117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
120  Id. at 2346-51.  Justice Stevens delivered the Court’s opinion, joined by Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsberg and Breyer.  Id. at 2333.  Justice O’Connor, joined by 
Chief Judge Rehnquist, wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Id.; see 
also Ian C. Ballon, Linking, Framing and Other Hot Topics in Internet Law and Litigation, 
520 P.L.I/PAT 167, 299-302 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course 
Handbook Series No. G0-0001, 1998) (listing the remaining constitutional provisions of the 
CDA); see generally Nathan M. Semmel, Talking Back to Cyber-Mum: Challenging the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 533 (1998) (concluding the 
passing of the CDA showed a lack of confidence in American family values and finding it is 
up to parents to choose what their children see and read); Al Harrison, Internet: Supreme 
Court Holds That Communications Decency Act is Unconstitutional, 35-FEB HOUS. LAW. 44 
(1998) (providing details of the Supreme Court decision in Reno II). 
121  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2346. The Court found that due to the vagueness of the CDA, it 
silenced speech that would be otherwise entitled to constitutional protection.  Id.  According 
to the Court: 
[T]he CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a 
constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. That burden on adult 
speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in 
achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve. 
Id. 
122  Id. at 2344-50.  The Court agreed that due to the unique characteristics of the Internet, 
previous Supreme Court opinions “provide no basis for qualifying the level of First 
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the internet].”  Id. at 2344.  The Court also 
agreed the statute was similar to the Sable dial-a-porn ban.  Id. at 2346.  In Sable, the Court 
made it clear that just because a regulation is passed to protect minors from harmful material 
doesn’t end the inquiry as to whether the regulation is valid.  Id.  
123  Id. at 2341-43.  In the government’s appeal it argued the district court erred in finding 
the CDA was overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment and that the CDA was 
vague and violated the First Amendment.  Id. at 2341.  The Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court’s decision without reaching the Fifth Amendment inquiry.  Id. 
124  390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding statute prohibiting the sale to minors of material 
otherwise available for sale to adults due to the state’s interest in the welfare of its children).  
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Inc.126  Justice Stevens declined to follow precedent and distinguished the Internet from 
traditional broadcast media.127 
 
The Court went on to identify three important criteria to explain why the Internet 
was subject to strict scrutiny, while broadcast media was subject to a lesser standard of 
review:128 
 
? The Internet has no history of extensive government regulation.129 
 
? The Internet has no scarcity of available frequencies.130 
 
? The Internet does not “invade” an individual’s home.131 
 
In particular, the Court focused on the non-invasive nature of the Internet, as compared 
to radio or television.132  The Court held that the CDA was similar to the case of Sable 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC,133 where it struck down a ban on “dial-a-porn” services. 
 The Court likened the telephone used to access pornographic recordings to using a 
computer to access pornography on the Internet, because both require “the listener to 
take affirmative steps to receive the communication.”134 
 
 The Court held that the indecency provisions of the CDA were unconstitutionally 
overbroad.135  Although the Court stated that protecting children from exposure to 
sexually explicit material was a compelling governmental interest, it found that the CDA 
                                                                                                                         
125  438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC restriction of radio broadcasts that it found 
indecent, but not obscene, because the broadcast in question was aired in the afternoon with 
children in the listening audience). 
126  475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult theaters from 
locating in residential areas). 
127  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341-44 (1997).  The Court determined the Ginsberg  holding 
was narrower than the CDA because the CDA took away parents’ ability to choose what 
material was proper for their children.  Id. at 2341.  The Court determined the Pacifica case 
involved broadcasting which received the least First Amendment protection due to its 
scarcity of frequencies and invasive nature, while the Internet could not compare.  Id. at 2342. 
 The Court distinguished Renton on the basis that the Internet does not have identifiable 
boundaries like the zoning ordinance at issue in that case.  Id.  
128  Gary D. Allison, The Cyberwar of 1997: Timidity and Sophistry at the First 
Amendment Front, 33 TULSA L.J. 103, 115 (1997) (summarizing the differences between the 
Internet and broadcasting media as found by the Supreme Court in Reno II). 
129  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 397-400 
(1969)).  The Court noted the Internet has never been subject to government regulation, 
unlike traditional broadcast media.  Id. 
130  Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)).  The Court found that 
because over 40 million users across the world have the capacity to access the Internet at a 
low cost, the medium does not have scarce operating resources.  Id. at 2344. 
131  Id. at 2343 (citing Sable Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989).  The Court found a 
user must take “affirmative steps” to access pornography on the Internet.  Id.  
132  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343-44 (1997) (agreeing with the district court’s finding that 
Internet communications do not invade the user’s home). 
133  Sable, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989). 
134  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28). “Placing a telephone call 
[or retrieval of information from the Internet] is not the same as turning on a radio and being 
taken by surprise by an indecent message.”  Id. (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 128). 
135  Id. at 2343 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28). 
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suppressed an unacceptable amount of constitutionally protected speech for adults.136  
Since the Internet is open to anyone, regardless of age, the Court found that under the 
Act, adults had no feasible method to engage in constitutionally protected indecent 
speech.137  As a result, the unprecedented breadth of the CDA imposed a heavy burden 
on the government to explain why a less restrictive alternative would not be acceptable, 
a burden the government could not overcome.138 
 
Beyond the overbreadth issue, the Court invalidated the CDA’s indecency provisions 
on grounds of vagueness.139  Under the void for vagueness doctrine, a law is void on its 
face if individuals of “common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application.”140  The Court found that the failure of the statute to define 
the terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” left speakers uncertain as to what the 
terms meant, which resulted in a chilling effect on free speech.141  Additionally, the 
Court held the statute needed to include all three prongs of the Miller standard, rather 
than just one, to avoid vagueness.142  Consequently, the majority concluded that the 
CDA “amounted to ‘burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.’”143  The ruling makes it clear 
that statutes that attempt to regulate content on the Internet must meet the highest level 
of scrutiny.144  
 
E.  Legislative Tools in Place to Regulate Obscenity 
 
The existing federal obscenity statute has been successfully applied to the 
Internet.145  Those sections which may be applicable to the Internet are as follows:  18 
U.S.C. § 1460 makes it a crime to possess obscene material with the intent to 
                                                 
136  Id. at 2346. 
137  Id. at 2349-50. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. at 2344-46. 
140  Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
141  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997). 
142  Id. at 2345.  The Court found the third prong of the Miller test was extremely important 
because it set a national floor as to what constitutes artistic, political, literary, or scientific 
value.  Id.  The Court felt this was important because the first two prongs of the test are 
judged by only local opinion, so each state can assert its values as to what is  obscene.  Id.  
Consequently, the majority held the CDA’s use of the terms “indecent” and “patently 
offensive” undermined the goal to establish a uniform national standard for regulation of 
Internet speech.  Id. at 2344-45 and n.39. 
143  Id. at 2350 (citing Sable Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989)).  The Court went 
on to find “[t]he CDA, casting a far darker shadow over free speech, threatens to torch a large 
segment of the Internet community.”  Id. 
144  Kim L. Rappaport, Note & Comment, In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued 
Struggle in Western Constitutional Democracies with Internet Censorship and Freedom of 
Speech Online, 13 AM U. INT’L L. REV. 765, 784 (1998) (reviewing freedom of speech on the 
Internet, along with proposed legislation in the United States and Germany, and concluding 
technological solutions to control Internet content are just as restrictive of free speech as 
government interference because technology uses private parties to do the censoring the 
government would have done); see generally John J. Mcguire, The Sword of Damocles is Not 
Narrow Tailoring: The First Amendment’s Victory in Reno v. ACLU, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
413 (1998) (arguing the Court should continue to fully protect the Internet due to the free and 
diverse forum of communication it offers). 
145  18 U.S.C. §§ 1460-69 (1994 & Supp. 1997); see also  Goldman, supra  note 12, at 1108-11 
(describing current federal anti-pornography statutes and determining the statutes are 
medium-related and are not clearly applicable to the Internet). 
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distribute,146 while 18 U.S.C. § 1462 makes it a crime to distribute or receive obscene 
materials through a common carrier in interstate or foreign commerce.147  18 U.S.C. § 
1464 prohibits broadcasting “obscene, indecent, or profane language.”148  Finally, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1465 and 1466 prohibit one from knowingly transporting or engaging in the 
business of selling obscene, lewd or filthy material through interstate commerce.149  
  
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals successfully applied 18 U.S.C. § 1465 in United 
States v. Thomas,150 the first Internet obscenity case tried.151  There, the court 
determined that using a computer to transmit pornographic material violated 18 U.S.C. § 
1465.152   
 
Finally, another federal anti-obscenity law is the Child Pornography Act (CPA), 
which prior to September 30, 1996 provided:  
 
anyone who knowingly ships, distributes, or receives . . . ‘by any means including 
computer,’ or knowingly possesses, three or more copies of, any visual depiction of 
sexually explicit conduct produced by means  involving the use of a minor engaging 
in such conduct, is guilty of a felony punishable by up to ten years in prison . . . .153 
 
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) amended and broadened the 
CPA by prohibiting the production and distribution of computer-generated or other 
mechanically altered images of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.154  
                                                 
146  18 U.S.C. §1460 (1994); The text of this statute states, in part:  
Whoever . . . in the . . . territorial jurisdiction of the United States, . . . knowingly sells 
or possesses with intent to sell an obscene visual depiction shall be punished by a 
fine in accordance with the provisions of this title or imprisoned for not more than 2 
years, or both. 
Id. 
147  18 U.S.C. §1462 (1994 & Supp. 1997); see also  Goldman, supra  note 12, at 1109 (noting 
that among the current anti-obscenity laws, Section 1462 is the most applicable to the Internet 
because an Internet service provider is analogous to a common carrier and thus falls within 
the provisions of Section 1462). 
148  18 U.S.C. §1464 (1994). The statute states “[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or 
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” Id.; see generally Charles D. Ferris and 
Terrence J. Leahy, Red Lions, Tigers and Bears; Broadcast Content Regulation and the First 
Amendment, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 299 (1989) (arguing that broadcast content requires a limited 
amount of government oversight). 
149  18 U.S.C. §§1465-1466 (1994 & Supp. 1997); for the text of 18 U.S.C. §1465, see infra 
note 246; 18 U.S.C. 1466 states, in part: 
Whoever is engaged in the business of selling or transferring obscene matter, who 
knowingly receives or possesses with intent to distribute any obscene book, 
magazine, picture, paper, film, videotape, or phonograph or other audio recording, 
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, shall be 
punished by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or by a fine under this title, or 
both. 
18 U.S.C. § 1466 (1994). 
150  74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). 
151  For further discussion on the Thomas case, see infra notes 245-48 and accompanying 
text. 
152  Thomas, 74 F.3d at 707-08. 
153  Clapes, supra  note 35, at 7-8 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1461, 1463, 1464, 1468). 
154  18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. 1997); Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. 
18
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Recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals successfully applied this statute in United 
States v. Carroll,155 which involved the distribution of child pornography on the 
Internet.156  There, the court determined that Internet distribution was the same as 
transportation in interstate commerce.157 
 
F.  Child Online Protection Act (COPA):  The Second Round 
 
The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) is Congress’ second attempt at restricting 
Internet content.  President Bill Clinton signed COPA into law on October 21, 1998.158  
Less than twenty-four hours later, the same groups who challenged the CDA in 1996159 
challenged COPA as unconstitutional claiming it is overbroad and threatens adult access 
to legitimate, constitutionally protected material.160  On November 19, 1998, the United 
                                                                                                                         
L. No. 104-208, Title I, §121(3a); 110 Stat. 3009-28 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§2241, 2243, 2251, 
2252, 2256, 42 U.S.C. §2000aa, and adding 18 U.S.C. §2252A); see also  David J. Loundy, Who 
Hasn’t Noticed? Child Porn Already Illegal, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 14, 1998, at 6 (arguing 
the CPPA is unnecessary Internet legislation because existing child pornography laws work 
to prevent harm caused by the distribution of the material online; no child is harmed in the 
creation of synthetic porn prohibited by the CPPA); see generally Sheri A. Dillon, Douglas E. 
Groene, et. al., Computer Crimes, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 503, 518-19 (1998) (summarizing the 
CPPA); Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A 
Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 439 (1997); Jennifer Stewart, If This is the 
Global Community, We Must Be On The Bad Side of Town: International Policing of Child 
Pornography on the Internet, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 205 (1997). 
155  105 F.3d 740 (1st Cir. 1997). 
156  For further discussion on the Carroll case, see infra notes 249-252 and accompanying 
text. 
157  Carrol, 105 F.3d at 742. 
158  See, e.g., Channel 2000 - ACLU Fights New ‘Net Restrictions (visited Oct. 23, 1998) 
<http://www.cbs2.com/ news/stories/news-981022-053838.html>; Dan Robrish, ACLU Files 
Suit vs. Internet Law (visited Oct. 23, 1998) 
<http://dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/ap/technology/story.html?s=v/ap/19981022/tc/intern
et_decency_l.html>; Representative Mike Oxley (R-Ohio) authored the new law.  See, e.g., 
David Walsh, World Socialist Web Site, US Group Sues Over Attempt at Internet Censorship 
(visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.wsws.org/ news/1998/oct1998/ net-024.shtml>.  The 
Clinton administration raised objections to the bill based on an analysis by the United States 
Justice Department concluding it was probably unconstitutional.  Id.  However, Oxley 
pressured the White House by stating to reporters, in reference to the Monica Lewinsky 
investigation, “Here’s a chance for the White House to lead   . . . [and] regain its moral 
compass.  I sincerely hope they join us in trying to lift this country up.”  Frank James, 
Internet Anti-Smut Law Challenged as Unconstitutional, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23, 1998, at 3. 
159  The 17 plaintiffs include the American Civil Liberties Union (on behalf of all its 
members), The American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, A Different Light 
Bookstore, ArtNet, The Blackstripe, Electronic Frontier Foundation (on behalf of all its 
members), Condomania, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Free Speech Media, LLC, 
Internet Content Coalition (whose members include CBS New Media, The New York Times 
Electronic Media Company, Time Inc., C/Net, Warner Bros. Online, Playboy Enterprises, 
MSNBC, Sony Online and ZDNet), OBGYN.NET, PlanetOut Corporation, Philadelphia Gay 
News, Powell’s bookstore, RIOTGRRL, Salon Magazine, and Weststock.com.   American Civil 
Liberties Union Freedom Network: ACLU v. Reno, Round 2: Broad Coalition Files 
Challenge to New Federal Net Censorship Law (visited Nov. 9, 1998) 
<http://www.aclu.org/features /f1101698a. html> [hereinafter Round 2]. 
160  The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court in Pennsylvania requesting a 
preliminary injunction to block the enforcement of the law.  Walsh, supra  note 158.  
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a motion for a 
temporary restraining order and halted enforcement of COPA until a court resolves its 
constitutionality.161  On February 1, 1999, the judge issued a preliminary injunction 
blocking enforcement of the law, finding it threatened the right to free speech.162 
 
Congress’ explicit purpose and alleged compelling government interest in passing the 
new law was to protect children from harmful material on the web while preserving 
adults’ First Amendment rights.163  The main difference between the new law and the 
CDA is that COPA purports to apply only to commercial web sites, and it embodies a 
“harmful to minors” standard rather than the obscenity standard of the CDA. 164  
  
COPA makes it a federal crime to knowingly make “any communication for 
commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material that is 
harmful to minors.”165  The Act provides affirmative defenses to liability if commercial 
adult web site operators block minors from accessing material deemed “harmful to 
minors” on their sites.166  Actions that a content provider could take include “requiring 
                                                                                                                         
According to Ann Beeson, attorney for the ACLU, “This law, just like Congress’ first attempt 
to regulate speech on the Internet, makes it a crime for adults to communicate and receive 
information on the Web that is clearly constitutionally protected.” Elizabeth Weise, First 
Federal Net Privacy Law Approved, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 1998, at D1. 
161  American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, Judge Halts Enforcement of Internet 
Censorship Law (Nov. 19, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/features/f101698a.html>; American 
Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, Temporary Restraining Order Memorandum  in 
ACLU v. Reno II (visited Nov. 20, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/court/ acluvrenoII_tro.html>.  
Judge Lowell A. Reed, Jr. found the plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the claim 
that COPA violates adults’ First Amendment rights.  Id.  He found the plaintiffs raised 
“serious and substantial questions as to the technological and economic feasibility of these 
affirmative defenses.”  Id. 
162  Miller, supra  note 3, at 01A.  United States District Judge Lowell Reed posted the 
decision on the internet at www.paed.uscourts.gov, the court’s web site.  He wrote, “[i]ndeed, 
perhaps we do the minors of this country harm if the First Amendment protections, which 
they will with age inherit fully, are chipped away in the name of protection.”  Id.  Government 
lawyers must now decide whether to ask for a full trial before Judge Reed, appeal the decision, 
or allow it to stand.  Id. 
163  H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 5 (1998). 
164  Walsh, supra  note 158; 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)(1998); COPA states: 
‘material that is harmful to minors’ means any communication, picture, image, 
graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is 
obscene or that- 
(Error! Main Document Only.)  the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with 
respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the 
prurient interest; 
(Error! Main Document Only.)  depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner 
patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or 
sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd 
exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breasts; and 
(Error! Main Document Only.)  taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value for minors. 
47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(1998). 
165  § 231(a)(1). 
166  § 231(c)(1) (specifying the affirmative defenses to the Act); see also James, supra note 
158. 
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use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification 
number,”167  “accepting a digital certificate that verifies age,”168 or “any other 
reasonable measures”169 prior to allowing users to view the web site content.  Penalties 
for not implementing such measures include fines of up to $50,000 for each day in 
violation and up to six months in prison.170  The government may also bring a civil suit 
against individuals with a penalty of up to $50,000 for each violation.171 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
A.   The COPA is Unconstitutional 
 
Like the CDA, the effect of COPA is that it criminalizes constitutionally protected 
adult speech and “reduces the Internet to what is fit for a six-year-old.”172  Congress 
claims COPA applies only to commercial web transactions which display material that is 
harmful to minors, and not to non-commercial activities.173  However, the law actually 
bans a wide range of protected speech that is provided without a fee by individuals who 
also happen to be communicating for other commercial purposes.174  In order to fully 
understand this idea, one must carefully examine the Act’s broad definition of 
“commercial purposes.”175  It states that a person makes a communication for 
commercial purposes if he “is engaged in the business of making such 
communications.”176  The Act’s definition of “engaged in the business” states “it is not 
necessary that the person make a profit  . . . [nor] that the making . . . [of] such 
communications be the person’s . . . principal business.”177   
Many content providers carry material that relates to sex and allow users to access 
their content for free, while attempting to make a profit by means other than selling the 
material, such as in the following situations: 
                                                 
167  47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A)(1998); see also  H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 14 (1998).  In order to 
obtain a personal identification number (PIN) for access to an adult site, the consumer clicks 
on a link to the age verification system used by the site.  Id.  Consumers may instantly receive 
a PIN by submitting an application to the system with credit card information.  Id.  If the 
information is verified, a PIN number is issued.  Id.  The verification generally takes five to ten 
seconds.  Id. 
168  47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(B) (1998). 
169  § 231(c)(1)(C). 
170  § 231(a)(1); § 231(a)(2). 
171  § 231(a)(3).  In sum, “if you’re supplying smut, you must set up an age verification 
process . . . if you don’t, you’ll face a $50,000 fine and six months in jail.”  Sequel, supra note 
1. 
172  Round 2 , supra  note 159 (quoting ACLU attorney, Ann Beeson).  “Whether you call it 
the ‘Communications Decency Act’ or the ‘Congress Doesn’t Understand the Internet Act,’ it 
is still unconstitutional . . .”  Id.; see, e.g., Walsh, supra  note 158. 
173  H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 12 (1998) (stating COPA applies only to commercial web 
transactions which contain material harmful to minors and it does not prohibit non-commercial 
activities). 
174  Round 2 , supra  note 159; American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, ACLU v. 
Reno Complaint for Declatory and Injunctive Relief, (visited Nov. 9, 1998) 
<http://www.aclu.org/court/ acluvrenoII_complaint. html> [hereinafter ACLU Complaint].  
Providers who sell content on their web sites that is harmful to minors are exempt from the 
Act when the purchaser pays with a debit or credit card. 47 U.S.C. §231(c) (1998). 
175  § 231(e)(2)(A). 
176  Id. 
177  § 231(e)(2)(B). 
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? A web publisher which attempts to make a profit through advertising, just 
like a traditional newspaper or magazine; 
 
? An online music store or art store which allows users to browse their 
content for free, like browsing in an ordinary bookstore or art gallery; or 
 
? A content provider who attempts to make a profit by charging 
contributors, but gives users free access.178  
 
According to the Act’s “commercial purposes” definition, these “commercial” content 
providers would be forced to implement a means to restrict access by minors, even 
though their material is non-commercial.179  Therefore, COPA does not prohibit only 
the sale of material harmful to minors, it actually restricts non-commercial speech as 
well.180  This is the same overbreadth characteristic that the Supreme Court struck 
down in the CDA in Reno v. ACLU I.181  Additionally, requiring content providers to 
obtain a credit card number from a user “essentially forces free speech to become 
commercial speech in order to remain legal.”182  If an adult user does not have a credit 
card, he cannot read constitutionally protected material.183 
                                                 
178  ACLU Complaint, supra  note 174 (providing these examples to support its argument 
that COPA bans constitutionally protected speech that various individuals and organizations 
provide for free, including the web content provided by popular magazines and news web 
sites). 
179  The Starr Report is an example of free content which would be illegal under COPA.  
Sequel, supra  note 1.  Many of the online content providers that carry the document are news 
web sites which make profits by charging contributors or advertisers, but users access their 
sites for free.  ACLU Complaint, supra  note 174.  However, due to the graphic sexual details 
contained in the Starr Report, it would be illegal for these news sites to carry the report.  
James, supra  note 158. According to Mark Segal, editor of the Philadelphia Gay News, 
We once published in newspapers in Philadelphia and on web sites, (former 
Surgeon General) C. Everett Koop’s complete report on AIDS.  If this law was active 
at that time, those of us who published that could go to jail . . . [the law] is life-
threatening [because banned web site information could save lives]. 
Walsh, supra  note 158. 
180  Department of Justice Letter on CDA II (visited Oct. 23, 1998) 
<http://www.aclu.org/court/acluvrenoII_doj_ letter.html> [hereinafter DOJ Letter] (discussing 
COPA and its many ambiguities in the scope of its coverage, and finding it is evidence that 
the Act is not narrowly tailored as required by the strict scrutiny standard for the Internet). 
181  117 S. Ct. 2329, 2347.  The Court stated that: 
The breadth of the CDA’s coverage is wholly unprecedented.  Unlike the 
regulations upheld in Ginsberg and Pacifica, the scope of the CDA is not limited to 
commercial speech or commercial entities.  Its open-ended prohibitions embrace all 
nonprofit entities and individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them . . . 
in the presence of minors. 
Id.; Despite lawmakers’ claim that the new bill is narrowly tailored to apply only to minors, 
ACLU Staff Attorney Ann Beeson said that the constitutional flaws in this law are identical to 
the flaws that led the Supreme Court to strike down the CDA.  Walsh, supra  note 158.  But see 
H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 13 (1998) (stating Congress’ view that COPA is limited to commercial 
transactions as required by Reno II). 
182  Joe Nickell, Government Sued Over Online Anti-Porn Law (visited Oct. 23, 1998) 
<http://dailynews.yahoo. com/headlines/wr/story.html?s-v/hm/19981022/wr/speech_l.html> 
(summarizing the argument of Stanton McCandlish, program director for the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, a co-plaintiff in the current suit).  Additionally, “[t]hose of us who have 
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Although the Act provides affirmative defenses to liability, none of them are 
technologically or economically achievable for providers of free web content.184  The 
credit or debit card option is unavailable to free content providers because financial 
institutions will not verify them without a financial transaction.185  Adult identification 
systems may currently be used by some commercial distributors of adult content,186 
but it is technologically and economically unavailable to providers who provide their 
content for free.187  Because free Internet content is available to all users, regardless of 
age, and there are no reasonable means for free content providers to verify users’ age, 
these providers are only left with the options of making speech available to all users or 
to none.188 
 
Further evidence of the unconstitutionality of COPA is found in an analysis of the bill 
written by the United States Justice Department which was sent to Congress on 
October 5, 1998, sixteen days before President Clinton signed COPA into law.189  In 
                                                                                                                         
credit cards have another problem.  Is there anybody in the world we want to possess our 
credit card numbers less than commercial porno peddlers?” Aaron Myers, A Bad Idea Gets 
Even Worse, THE BROOKINGS REGISTER, Oct. 29, 1998, at A4. 
183  Nickell, supra  note 182 (quoting Stanton McCandlish, program director for the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, a co-plaintiff in the current suit). 
184  ACLU Complaint, supra  note 174 (finding 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A) is the same as a 
CDA defense the Court found unavailable to content providers in Reno I).  It is an affirmative 
defense under COPA if a content provider that carries material that is harmful to minors has 
restricted access by minors “(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access 
code, or adult personal identification number; (B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies 
age; or (C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology.” 
47 U.S.C. §231(c)(1)(1998). 
185  ACLU Complaint, supra  note 174.  The ACLU believes there are no reasonable means, 
given available technology, for free content providers to restrict access by minors.  Id. 
186  H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 14 (1998) (finding the use of the various forms of age 
verification prescribed in the Act are standard practice among some commercial pornography 
distributors on the web).  According to Congress: 
It is not only economically feasible for commercial content providers to comply with 
the bill, but profitable for them to do so. . . . Given that the scope of the bill is limited 
to commercial activity, and that the age verification system procedures prescribed 
under the bill represent standard procedures for conducting commercial activity on 
pornographic Web sites, the effect of the bill is simply to . . . require age verification 
before pornography is made available . . . . 
Id. 
187  ACLU Complaint, supra  note 174.  The ACLU states in its recent complaint: 
Even if age or credit card verification were technologically or economically feasible, 
such requirements would fundamentally alter the nature and values of the new 
computer communication medium, which is characterized by spontaneous, 
instantaneous, albeit often unpredictable, communication by hundreds of 
thousands of individual speakers around the globe, and which provides an 
affordable and often seamless means of accessing an enormous and diverse body of 
information, ideas and viewpoints. Pre-registration or screening requirements would 
undermine the unique characteristics of this new technology. 
Id.   
188  Id.  On its face, the Act applies to adult communications because all free web content 
is available to both minors and adults.  Id. 
189  DOJ Letter, supra  note 180.  Acting Assistant Attorney General L. Anthony Sutin sent 
the letter to Representative Thomas Bliley (R-Va.), chairman of the House Commerce 
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that analysis the Justice Department said the bill suffered from serious constitutional 
problems and found it would not be wise to divert resources away from more important 
initiatives, such as combating online traffickers of hard-core child pornography and 
predators of children.190  Constitutional problems noted in the analysis include 
numerous ambiguities with regard to the scope of its coverage.191  The Justice 
Department found the presence of such ambiguity undermines “the likelihood that the 
[bill] has been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors from 
potentially harmful materials.”192  According to the Justice Department, one of the 
“troubling ambiguities” involves the breadth and clarity of the three part “harmful to 
minors” standard.193  It found the standard was unclear, particularly because the first 
prong is ambiguous as to which “contemporary community standard” would be 
dispositive.194 
 
The Justice Department also found that it is uncertain whether the Act will limit 
access by minors to harmful materials, as children still would be able to access 
pornography from alternative sources, including chat rooms.195  Further, the Internet is 
global in nature and all web content, regardless of origin, is available to all users 
worldwide.196  Therefore, children have access to an infinite amount of overseas web 
sites.  Because 40% of web content originates overseas and cannot be regulated by 
                                                                                                                         
Committee.  James, supra  note 158. 
190  DOJ Letter, supra  note 180.  The Department of Justice currently devotes a large 
amount of resources to the “Innocent Images” FBI undercover operation which started in 
1995.  Id.  Through this operation, agents and officers go online to track individuals who are 
victimizing children.  Id.  To date, the initiative has obtained 196 indictments, 202 arrests, 207 
convictions, and 456 evidentiary searches were carried out.  Id.; see generally Marc D. 
Goodman, Why The Police Don’t Care About Computer Crime , 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465 
(1997). 
191  DOJ Letter, supra note 180. 
192  Id. (quoting, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997)). The analysis predicted that COPA would be 
challenged on constitutional grounds because it is a “content-based restriction applicable to 
‘the vast democratic form of the Internet.’ ” Id. (quoting Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2329, 2343, 
2351); There are many more effective alternative means to assist parents in limiting their 
children’s access to harmful material, including special software applications.  Id. 
193  DOJ Letter, supra  note 180.  COPA partially defines material that is “harmful to minors” 
as material “the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, 
taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is 
designed to pander to, the prurient interest.” 47 U.S.C. §231(e)(6)(A) (1998) (stating the first 
prong of a three-part test). 
194  DOJ Letter, supra  note 180.  The Justice Department’s analysis asks: 
Which “contemporary community standards” would be dispositive? Those of the 
judicial district (or some other geographical “community”) in which the expression is 
“posted”? Of the district or local community in which the jury sits? Of some 
“community” in cyberspace? Some other “community”? Resolution of this question 
might well affect the statute’s constitutionality. 
Id.; see also  infra Section III.B. 
195  DOJ Letter, supra  note 180.  The DOJ found COPA does not address those other 
sources of Internet material that is harmful to minors.  Id.  Practically and legally it would be 
difficult to regulate web sites overseas due to the serious questions of “extraterritorial 
enforcement.”  Id.    
196  ACLU Complaint, supra  note 174 (finding the government cannot show COPA will 
reduce minors’ access to material that is harmful to minors because of the global nature of the 
Internet). 
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Unites States law, the Act will not meet its purpose of protecting children from sexually 
oriented web content.197 
 
B.  The Community Standard and COPA 
 
The COPA criteria for “material that is harmful to minors” embodies the community 
standard guideline established in Miller v. California.198  The community standard 
leaves it up to jurors in the local community to decide what is obscene under the 
obscenity standard or, in the alternative, what is harmful to minors under COPA’s 
“harmful to minors” standard.199   
 
The community standard is extremely difficult to apply to the Internet because the 
Internet’s  reach is worldwide.200  When someone in a country with a conservative 
community standard receives sexually explicit material via the Internet from a country 
that permits and encourages bigamy or nudity, for example, it becomes difficult to 
determine which community standard should govern.201  For this reason, never has a 
community been so difficult to define as that of the Internet.202 
 
Because the Internet is a global medium, COPA’s mandated application of the 
community standard to the Internet creates a national or international community 
standard where the standard of the nation or the world as a whole determines what is 
harmful to minors.203  Originally, Justices Harlan and Brennan advanced the idea of a 
                                                 
197  Id.  It is not possible to block overseas content from entering the United States and 
users may access content from overseas just as easily as content which originates from local 
sources.  Id.  Therefore, the Act will not accomplish its goal of protecting children from web 
material that is harmful to minors.  Id. 
198  413 U.S. 15 (1973).  The first of the three criteria in the COPA “harmful to minors” 
standard includes “the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would 
find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is 
designed to pander to, the prurient interest.”  47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(A)(1998) (emphasis 
added). 
199  Miller, 413 U.S. at 30; see also 47 U.S.C. §231(e)(6) (1998). 
200  Handelman, supra  note 10, at 731; see also  Todd H. Flaming, The Rules of Cyberspace: 
Informal Law in a New Jurisdiction, 85 ILL. B.J. 174, 178 (1997) (discussing the application of 
local law to cyberspace and finding the application difficult because cyberspace crosses 
international and local jurisdictional and geographical boundaries). 
201  Pollack, supra  note 38, at 472; see generally Dawn A. Edick, Regulation of 
Pornography on the Internet in the United States and the United Kingdom: A Comparative 
Analysis, 21 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 437 (1998) (concluding the United Kingdom’s 
program of self-regulation is preferable to the United States’ federal legislation because 
federal legislation represses freedom of speech); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet as a Threat 
to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet’s Role in Strengthening National And Global 
Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 423, 424 (1998) (finding the Internet will strengthen 
global governance and cooperation by “(1) strengthening international law; (2) strengthening 
economic interdependence; (3) empowering non-governmental organizations and improving 
their abilities to contribute productively to the development of international regimes designed 
to deal with global problems; and (4) supporting international security mechanisms”). 
202  Gobla, supra  note 8, at 122; see generally Susan J. Drucker, The Tenets of Jurisdiction: 
Lost in Cyberspace?, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 30 (December, 1997) (concluding international 
agreements are the answer to Internet content issues due to the Internet’s global reach). 
203  According to David Sobel, general counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center and plaintiff co-counsel, “There is a very real problem with applying a highly 
subjective standard, the ‘harmful to minors’ standard, which has traditionally been applied at 
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national standard in two plurality opinions of Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day204 and 
Jacobellis v. Ohio.205  Subsequently, the Court rejected the concept in Miller due to its 
unmanageability.206  Because various communities in the world differ in their tolerance 
of sexually oriented material, an international standard will impose the standards of one 
community upon the rest of the world.207  A permissive community will force less 
tolerant communities to accept material they deem offensive and likewise, the standard 
of a restrictive community will prevent tolerant communities from accessing materials 
they would otherwise accept.208  
 
To overcome this problem, some have suggested that Congress apply the Miller 
community standard to the virtual community or the community of users online, 
regardless of geographic location.209  The argument concludes that while a user is on-
line, he is part of a virtual community and is governed by its standards.210  Advocates 
                                                                                                                         
the local level, to a global medium.”  Nickell, supra  note 182.  Compare Godwin, supra  note 
69, at 272-73 (suggesting courts should abandon the community standard guideline 
altogether, due to the chilling effect of users having to censor themselves to avoid being 
prosecuted under another community’s standard). 
204  370 U.S. 478 (1962).  Justice Harlan analyzed the Roth standard and determined it 
included a national community standard.  Id. at 488.  He concluded a local standard would 
result in “the intolerable consequence of denying some sections of the country access to 
material, there deemed acceptable, which in others might be considered offensive to 
prevailing community standards of decency.”  Id. 
205  378 U.S. 184 (1964).  Justice Brennan concluded a local community standard would be 
unconstitutional because it could not “properly be employed in delineating the area of 
expression that is protected by the Federal Constitution.”  Id. at 193.  He felt a local 
community standard would limit First Amendment rights.  Id. at 194.  
206  Stepka, supra  note 69, at 918 (discussing the history of the community standard prong 
of the obscenity test and concluding that a local standard is better than a national standard 
because communities should not have their standards set by other communities); Handelman, 
supra  note 10, at 730. 
207  Stepka, supra  note 69, at 918 (arguing that a willing viewer who downloads obscene 
material from the Internet is analogous to a willing person traveling to another community and 
returning with the material); “[T]he ‘community standards’ criterion as applied to the Internet 
means that any communication available to a nation-wide audience will be judged by the 
standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message.” Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 
2329, 2347 (1997); see generally Stephan Wilske and Teresa Schiller, International 
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 
117 (1997) (finding states should exercise jurisdiction over the Internet because international 
solutions are still at an early state of development). 
208  Stepka, supra  note 69, at 918.  According to Joey Manely, director of Free Speech 
Internet Television, a co-plaintiff in the current suit, COPA is “a thinly veiled attempt to 
impose the community standards of the most repressive communities in America on all of the 
Internet community.”  Nickell, supra  note 182. 
209  Stepka, supra  note 69, at 935-36; Wu, supra  note 13, at 302-03; see generally Flaming, 
supra  note 200. 
210  Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to 
the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1652-54 (1995) (analyzing the 
options of which community standard to apply to the Internet, including the community of 
the provider, the downloading user, or the virtual community, concluding if it negatively 
impacts the local community the jurisdictional rules of the geographical location should 
apply); Joanna H. Kim, Comment, Cyber-Porn Obscenity: The Viability of the Local 
Community Standards and the Federal Venue Rules in the Computer Network Age, 15 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L.J. 415, 430, 441 (1995) (finding it is “more reasonable to use the ‘virtual 
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argue that the privacy established while the user is on the computer isolates him from 
the geographic community.211   
 
Problems with implementing this option include the following: even while on-line the 
user remains part of the geographic community; the scope of the on-line community is 
difficult to define as not all users access the same services; and the virtual community 
may choose to reject an aspect of traditional government, forcing lawmakers outside 
the virtual community to recognize a form of government with which they disagree.212 
 
In order to illustrate the difficulty of applying the Miller community standard to the 
Internet, it is necessary to return to the case of United States v. Thomas.213  The 
Thomas’s ran their adults-only Internet bulletin board system out of their home in 
Milpitas, California.214  Federal agents indicted them in Memphis, Tennessee, where the 
U.S. Postal Inspector was sitting at the time he browsed the Thomas’s BBS.215   
 
The court disregarded the suggestion of a virtual community standard because the 
Thomas’s required users to submit an application to join the BBS, and based on that 
information, they should have known that users in Memphis viewed their pornographic 
material.216  Ironically, although the Thomas’s were never in Tennessee, they were 
convicted on pornography charges in Tennessee for violation of Tennessee law by a 
Tennessee jury applying the Memphis community standard as dictated by Miller.217  
                                                                                                                         
community’ to judge whether material is obscene” when a BBS [bulletin board service] is 
involved because those users that may be harmed by the allegedly obscene material are those 
that affirmatively access the BBS).    
211  Stepka, supra  note 69, at 935.  The idea behind the virtual community is: 
that on-line computer users form a sufficiently robust community to be recognized 
by the law, at least for purposes of the Miller obscenity analysis . . . .  [The idea is 
plausible as] a result of the inherent privacy of the user/computer relationship.  This 
privacy isolates the computer user from his or her geographic community, and 
imparts a feeling of participation in a self-sufficient on-line community. 
Id.; see generally Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems 
Approach--Potential, Problems, and a Proposal, 3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 175 (1998) 
(suggesting the implementation of a dispute resolution system for cyberspace which 
integrates the customs and rules of virtual communities). 
212  Stepka, supra  note 69, at 935-36; Flaming, supra  note 200, at 181 (arguing that allowing 
the Internet community to develop its own rules and resolve internal disputes may end up 
challenging the country’s traditional form of government because the Internet community 
favors decentralization and opposes hierarchy). 
213  74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). 
214  Id. at 705.  The Thomas’s followed FCC rules by requiring users to pay for bulletin 
board use with credit cards. Goldman, supra  note 12, at 1105 n.162.  Users could download, 
view, and print pornographic materials after paying a membership fee and receiving a 
password.  Thomas 74 F.3d at 705. 
215  Goldman, supra  note 12, at 1105-06.  A U.S. Postal inspector, working undercover, 
downloaded obscene pictures from the Thomas’s hard drive.  Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705.  As a 
member of the bulletin board the inspector had access to 17,000 sexual and graphic computer 
photos, indexed by topics including bestiality, torture or pedophilia.  Id. 
216  Thomas, 74 F.3d at 710-11.  The application required applicants to the BBS to fill in their 
name, address, phone number and signature.  Id. at 705. 
217  Pollack, supra  note 38, at 475 (concluding the Miller holding is ineffective in a time of 
changing technology and communication because what constitutes a community is also 
changing). 
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The end result is that the values of a more conservative jurisdiction in Tennessee may 
govern Internet speech all over the world.218   
 
Because the standard can produce different results based on the location of the 
receiver, reasonable users will be unable to predict what is deemed harmful to 
minors.219  This may deter constitutionally protected speech because speakers who 
cannot meet the infeasible affirmative defenses of COPA220 will be hesitant to share 
material over the Internet for fear of being charged with violating the “harmful to 
minors” standard of a distant community.221  The community standard incorporated 
into Internet legislation prevents users like the Thomas’s from understanding what is 
invalid and subjects them to penalties if their guess proves to be wrong.222   
 
Justice Stevens’ finding in Reno v. ACLU223 regarding the vagueness of the CDA is 
equally applicable to this idea, as it “may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than 
communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images.”224  Even if the user 
knows the location of the community whose standards govern, a determination of 
whether the material in question offends those standards remains entirely subjective.225   
                                                 
218  Id.  Handelman, supra  note 10, at 731 (finding all users mu st follow values of the most 
restrictive community if the Miller standard applies to the Internet). 
219  Clapes, supra  note 35, at 7; see also  Gobla, supra  note 8, at 129 (“Due to the very 
nature of the Internet, defining a community by which to judge potentially offensive material 
is impossible.”);  David J. Loundy, Knee-jerk Reaction Not a ‘Healthy Thing,’ CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., Jan. 11, 1996, at 6 (noting web site authors must remember, when designing their sites, 
that they may subject themselves to many different regulations in many different countries). 
220  For a discussion on the technological and economic infeasibility of the affirmative 
defenses of COPA, see supra  notes 184-188 and accompanying text. 
221  William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to 
the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 210 (1995) (finding if Internet users are 
forced to restrict speech to comply with the most restrictive community standards one of two 
results will occur: (1) ideas will remain unexpressed or (2) the Internet community, as a whole, 
will block access to users located in restrictive jurisdictions; finding either option chills free 
speech); Handelman, supra  note 10, at 737.  According to David Sobel, general counsel for 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center and co-counsel for the plaintiffs, “In order to avoid 
potential prosecution, a lot of the material would potentially disappear because a lot of sites 
would not want to risk being hauled into court in Mississippi or some such place.”  Nickell, 
supra  note 182.  Also,  
[R]equiring users to provide identifying information prior to being able to even 
browse a site to determine what it offers will deter users from entering those sites, 
and will reduce the commercial opportunities provided to plaintiffs and other 
speakers using the Web. Requiring adults to identify themselves before they can 
access speech defined as “harmful to minors” will also stigmatize that speech and 
thus deter access to protected speech. 
ACLU Complaint, supra  note 174. 
222  Allison, supra  note 128, at 116. 
223  117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (striking down portions of the CDA because the Act suppressed 
valid adult speech in an effort to protect minors from harmful speech). 
224  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-45.  The majority noted the Miller community standard was 
not unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 2345. 
225  Clapes, supra  note 35, at 7.  The Starr Report is an example of material that some 
communities may deem harmful to minors while others may not.  Sequel, supra note 1.  Peggy 
Peterson, communication director for Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio), sponsor of 
COPA, claims COPA would not censor the Starr Report.  Id.  However, “the fact that filtering 
programs blocked the report and that MSNBC online  . . . blocked portions of Clinton’s 
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C.  The Internet Does Not Fit Into Any Traditional Medium Category . . . Yet 
 
The Supreme Court created a “spectrum of control” which determines the 
appropriate First Amendment analysis for speech on various forms of technological 
communications.226  The least protected medium for speech is broadcasting because it 
enters the home with no invitation227 and it suffers from a scarcity of frequencies.228  
In the middle is cable television because it can be accessed with affirmative steps229 and 
is potentially pervasive.  The most protected medium is the telephone because users 
must take deliberate, affirmative steps to access the service.230  Currently, the Internet 
does not closely resemble any of these traditional categories.231   
 
If the Court is compelled to fit the Internet into a category, it seems to resemble the 
dial-a-porn rationale of Sable more than that of broadcasting or cable television for two 
reasons.232  First, the Internet is not pervasive; it is not an intruder.233  Like dial-a-porn 
users, the computer user takes deliberate steps to invite the Internet into his home.234  
According to Lisa M. Fantino, reporter and writer for WCBS -AM Radio in New York, 
NY: 
 
[T]he Internet explorer must make a monthly decision whether to continue 
his subscription to the Internet and, if dissatisfied, he may cancel his 
subscription at any time.  The Internet explorer is a pilot charting his own 
course.  By virtue of the subscription-only access, innocent bystanders 
                                                                                                                         
testimony demonstrates that some people do consider Clinton’s cigar shenanigans harmful to 
minors.”  Id. 
226  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2341-44; Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 
518 U.S. 727, 774-75 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (finding the constitutionally of indecency 
regulation for a medium depends partly on the characteristics of that medium). 
227  FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 n.2 (1978); Robert Cannon, The Legislative 
History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the 
Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L. J. 51, 79 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
First Amendment analysis of various communication media and how it considers the unique 
characteristics of each, as well as whether the government interest presented is compelling; 
concluding the Internet “is the opportunity for all citizens to have a voice” and the value of 
that opportunity outweighs the possible harm of offensive speech). 
228  Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731 
n.2; see supra  notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
229  Werst, supra  note 31, at 220; see supra  notes 98-105 and accompanying text. 
230  Werst, supra  note 31, at 220. 
231  Id. at 224 (finding the Internet is different than other communication technologies due 
to its evolution free of any content-based considerations, decentralization with no single 
point of control, global reach and the fact that users have no ability to select their audience). 
232  The majority in Reno found the Internet was analogous to dial-a-porn, rather than 
broadcast media and cable television.  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997).  Therefore, the 
CDA was subject to strict scrutiny.  Id. at 2344. 
233  Id. at 2343 (affirming that Internet communications do not invade a user’s home; users 
rarely encounter sexually explicit content by accident; and most of the sexually explicit 
Internet material is preceded by content warnings). 
234  Symposium, Panel III: Restricting Speech on the Internet: Finding an Appropriate 
Regulatory Framework , 8 FORDHAM INTELL.  PROP.  MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 395, 413 (1998) 
[hereinafter Restricting Speech] (stating the views of panelist, Lisa M. Fantino, reporter and 
writer for CBS radio station WCBS-AM in New York City, who believes Congress suppressed 
free speech through the enactment of the CDA); Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343. 
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cannot be offended . . . nor can children . . . access World Wide Web sites 
without the knowledge to type commands that will get them there.235 
 
Accessing content on the Internet requires more knowledge, as well as more deliberate 
and affirmative steps, than merely turning a dial to access the radio or television.236  
Second, the Internet is not afflicted with a scarcity of broadcast frequencies.237  On the 
contrary, whenever a new computer connects to the Internet, the Internet’s capabilities 
and size increase.238 
 
It is important to note that the Internet’s exemption from protected speech regulation 
may be only temporary.239  Cable modems and media alliances are beginning to turn the 
Internet into a type of medium closer to that of broadcasting.240  The Court relied upon 
specific Internet characteristics when determining the appropriate level of First 
Amendment protection.  If these characteristics no longer exist, the protection also may 
disappear.241 
 
D.  Existing Obscenity & Pornography Laws Work 
 
Although the Internet presents unique characteristics for legal application, there is no 
reason to believe it will force courts to abandon well-established legal concepts merely 
because the speech in question is communicated by computer.242  “Protected speech 
should be protected speech, no matter what its form.”243  Some courts have easily 
applied existing legal restrictions on various forms of speech to Internet 
communication.244 
 
                                                 
235  Restricting Speech, supra  note 234, at 413 (footnotes omitted). 
236  Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
237  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344. 
238  Pollack, supra  note 38, at 483.  But see Allison, supra  note 128, at 128-29 (arguing the Internet 
may suffer from scarce resources in the future because the Internet is growing rapidly and straining the 
resources which handle the increased traffic). 
239  Allison, supra note 128, at 132-33; The Supreme Court in Reno determined the Internet was 
entitled to full protection of the First Amendment.  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344. 
240  Clapes, supra  note 35, at 9. 
241  Allison, supra  note 128, at 132-33. 
242  William Bennett Turner, The First Amendment and the Internet, 482 PLI/Pat 33, 52-53 
(1997) (finding general state and federal laws established for other forms of communication 
are equally applicable to the Internet); see generally William Bennett Turner, Federal and 
State Attempts to Regulate the Internet after Reno v. ACLU, 520 PLI/Pat 595 (1998) (listing 
recent proposals for state and federal Internet regulation); Charles S. Sims, After the 
Communications Decency Act: Content Regulation in the Electronic Age, 516 PLI/Pat 447 
(1998) (discussing the historical development of obscenity and indecency regulation prior to 
the CDA and proposed regulations after the Court struck down the CDA). 
243  Peter Ludlow, Introduction to Chapter IV of HIGH NOON ON THE ELECTRONIC  
FRONTIER, CONCEPTUAL ISSUES  IN CYBERSPACE, 253, 253 (Peter Ludlow ed., 1996) (discussing 
United States v. Thomas and determining the community standard of the Miller obscenity 
test should not be applied to the Internet). 
244  Jessica McCausland, Regulating Computer Crime after Reno v. ACLU: The Myth of 
Additional Regulations, 49 FLA. L. REV. 483, 491 (1997) (finding some courts have had little or 
no trouble applying established law to the  new Internet situations and discussing the case of 
United States v. Thomas, which involved Internet obscenity). 
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For example, in United States v. Thomas245 federal agents charged the Thomas’s 
with violating federal anti-obscenity laws, including 18 U.S.C. §1465, which specifically 
regulates the “transportation of obscene matters for sale or distribution.”246  The 
defendants argued the statute did not apply to intangible objects such as computer 
files.247  The court disagreed and construed the federal obscenity law to include 
computer transmissions because the action allowed hard copies to be transmitted to 
distant locations.248 
 
In United States v. Carroll,249 the defendant was charged under the existing federal 
child pornography statute250 after his wife discovered that he took sexually-explicit 
photographs of his 13-year old niece with the intention of distributing them on the 
Internet.251  The First Circuit Court of Appeals found that the transmission of 
photographs over the Internet was equivalent to transporting them in interstate 
commerce and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.252 
 
The legislature passed these and other statutes long ago to criminalize such activities 
as the distribution of pornography.253  COPA and any future regulations enacted for this 
type of crime committed via the Internet result in double criminal liability for a 
defendant merely because he used a computer. 254  This implies crimes committed over 
the Internet are somehow more culpable.255  To the contrary, the distribution of 
                                                 
245  74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).  For a discussion of the Thomas case, see supra notes  213-
18 and accompanying text. 
246  18 U.S.C. §1465 (1994 & Supp. 1997). The statute states, in part: 
Whoever knowingly transports or travels in, or uses a facility or means of, interstate 
or foreign commerce or an interactive computer service . . . in or affecting such 
commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution of any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or 
filthy book, pamp hlet, picture, film . . . or any other matter of indecent or immoral 
character, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both. 
Id. 
247  Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706. 
248  Id. at 707-08.  
249  105 F.3d 740 (1st Cir. 1997). 
250  18 U.S.C. §2251(a) (1994);  This section states: 
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor 
to engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any 
visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished . . . if such person knows or has 
reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce or mailed, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. 
Id. 
251  Carroll, 105 F.3d at 741-42.  The defendant’s wife found two rolls of undeveloped film 
which containted 46 photos of their 13 year-old niece posing suggestively with sex toys and 
dressed in lingerie.  Id. at 741.  The court affirmed the defendant’s conviction under the 
federal child pornography statute.  Id. at 745. 
252  Id. at 742.  The court found the transmission of photos via the Internet was the same as 
moving them across state lines and therefore, equivalent to transportation in interstate 
commerce.  Id.  
253  McCausland, supra  note 244, at 496. 
254  Id. at 497-98 (arguing a pedophile who looks for minors at an elementary school to 
sexually exploit is just as culpable as one that reaches the same goal via the Internet). 
255  Id. 
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pornography is no more dangerous over the Internet than through the mail.256  The 
Internet does not increase these crimes, it just makes them easier to commit.257  For 
example, “[c]hild pornographers are going to do what they do with or without the 
internet,”258 as the Internet is just another method for delivery of pornographic 
material.259  Therefore, this second wave of obscenity and pornography regulation is 
difficult to justify based on the idea that courts cannot apply existing laws or that a 
computer makes certain crimes more dangerous.260 
 
E.  Effective Alternatives to Government Regulation 
 
There are many varieties of filtering and blocking computer programs available 
which screen out access to questionable Internet material.261  These programs 
empower parents with an effective tool to supervise their children’s use of the 
Internet.262  This is the least restrictive means available to meet the government’s goal 
of protecting minors from indecency, while preserving the fundamental right to free 
speech.263 
 
Filtering or blocking software blocks access to questionable web sites according to 
PICS (Platform for Internet Content Selection).264  PICS is a set of standards written in 
                                                 
256  Id. at 500 (finding the existence of the Internet has not increased the prevalence of 
crimes involving pornography). 
257  Id. (describing the arguments of those that oppose government regulation of the 
Internet). 
258  Id. at 499 (quoting Robbie Honerkamp, engineer for Mindspring Enterprises and former 
Director of Electronic Frontiers of Georgia). 
259  Id. at 500 (finding that only a small percentage of pornographic material is produced for 
the Internet).  For example, a distributor of child pornography will upload pictures to their web 
page rather than spending money on postage to distribute the material through the United 
States Postal Service.  Id. at 499-500. 
260  McCausland, supra  note 244, at 498-500.  Because the existing laws work for these 
crimes and it is unclear whether crimes have increased due to Internet use, new regulations 
are unnecessary.  Id. at 500.  Compare John C. Scheller, PC Peep Show: Computers, Privacy, 
and Child Pornography, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 989, 1013 (1994) (concluding that current 
legislation does not work effectively to control child pornography transmission on the 
Internet, and in order for new legislation to be effective it must destroy the anonymity of the 
illegal transmissions). 
261  Restricting Speech, supra  note 234, at 414.  The industry developed this software to 
aid parents in the supervision of their children’s Internet access.  Id.  The programs screen 
out questionable web pages.  Id. 
262  Dobeus, supra  note 19, at 656 (concluding parents must be responsible for the content 
their children access on the Internet in their homes because “[u]ser control of Internet 
content” and existing laws are adequate to protect children from potentially harmful Internet 
content). 
263  Restricting Speech, supra  note 234, at 414-15; Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 
58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  Broadcasters, authors, listeners, program suppliers and viewers 
challenged section 16(a) of the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, which was enacted to 
protect minors from indecent radio and television programs by limiting the hours in which 
they could be broadcast.  Id. at 656. The Act made an exception for public radio and television 
stations.  Id.  The court found the government had a compelling interest in protecting 
children.  Id. However, it held the Act was not the least restrictive means to obtain the 
government’s goal.  Id. at 682. 
264  Platform for Internet Content Selection (visited Jan 22, 1999) 
<http://www.w3.org/PICS/> (providing specific information on PICS, including links to pages 
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a common language used by rating services to label Internet content.265  The filtering 
software allows private parties to choose the ratings they prefer and block any material 
they do not want to access.266  The software is commercially accessible from 
numerous companies.267   
 
Some of the software manufacturers also serve as the rating service for their 
filtering product, such as Cyber Patrol268 and CYBERsitter.269  Cyber Patrol rates sites 
using fifteen categories including “violence/profanity” and “sexual acts” and within each 
category assigns a label of CyberNOT or CyberYES.270  On the other end of the 
spectrum, CYBERsitter blocks from single lists of questionable sites with no 
opportunity to block only a portion of any list.271   
 
Another rating service is the Recreational Software Advisory Council (RSAC) which 
also follows the PICS standard in its own rating system (RSACi).272  Under this 
system, web site creators voluntarily rate their own site content based on the categories 
of violence, nudity, sex and language.273  This system is available on SurfWatch, 
                                                                                                                         
describing technical specifications and frequently asked questions). 
265  PICS provides a standard labeling format so the filtering software can process a PICS 
complaint label.  Gobla, supra  note 8, at 125-26.  Creators or third parties may use a PICS 
based ratings system to label individual web sites.  Paul Resnick and James Miller, PICS: 
Internet Access Controls Without Censorship (visited 10/25/98) 
<http://www.w3.org/PICS/iacwcv2.htm> (concluding that filtering software using the PICS 
labeling language can meet diverse needs unlike a blanket restriction, which can never meet 
everyone’s needs). 
266  Jeffrey Rosen, Zoned Out: Can the Government Stop Cyberporn?, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Mar. 31, 1997, at 15. 
267  David K. Djavaherian, Reno v. ACLU, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 371, 383 (1998).  The 
software blocks certain questionable sites and prevents “inappropriate search terms” from 
being used.  Id. at 384.  For prices of some of the available software programs, see infra notes 
268-269. 
268  Cyber Patrol allows parents to restrict children’s access to certain hours of the day, 
limit total on-line time, and block access to specific web sites.  The Cyber Patrol Fact Sheet 
(visited 11/15/98) <http://www.cyberpatrol.com/fact. htm>.  A company team, including 
parents and teachers, reviews web sites.  Id.  The price of the software is $29.95 for the first 
three months and subsequent 12-month subscriptions cost $29.95.  How to Download/Order, 
Register/Review, Upgrade & Price Cyber Patrol (visited 11/15/98) 
<http:/www.cyberpatrol.com/cp_order.htm#pricing>. 
269  CYBERsitter claims  to block 100,000’s of sites unsuitable for children, such as sites 
regarding pornography, sexual issues and racism.  CYBERsitter For a Family Friendly 
Internet (visited 11/15/98) <http://www.solidoak. com/cybinfo.htm>.  The price is $39.95 with 
no additional charges for updates.  Id.  
270  The CyberNOT label criteria relate to advocacy information, such as how to obtain 
inappropriate materials and how to build, grow or use them.  Cyber Patrol CyberNOT List 
Criteria (visited 11/15/98) <http://www.micro sys.com/cyber/cp_list.htm>.  The categories do 
not relate to sites expressing an opinion or educational information.  Id. 
271 CYBERsitter For a Family Friendly Internet, (visited 11/15/98) 
<http://www.solidoak.com/cysitter.htm>. 
272  The Software Publishers Association created RSAC in 1994 to establish a rating 
system for computer games and other media, such as the Internet.  Recreational Software 
Advisory Council on the Internet (visited 11/15/98) <http://www.rsac.org/homepage.asp>. 
273  Gobla, supra  note 8, at 127-28.  A web site questionnaire allows providers to rate their 
own sites using the system. Recreational Software Advisory Council on the Internet (visited 
11/15/98) <http://www.rsac.org/homepage.asp>. 
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CyberPatrol 3.0 and Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0.274  Parents use a password to 
select the level of each category for their child.275  If a content provider does not self-
rate his web site, it is blocked.276  There are three important advantages to using 
filtering software rather than government regulation to protect children from indecent 
Internet content: 
 
First, blocking [and/or filtering] software is available from several different 
companies at little or no cost.  Second, the software can filter across jurisdictional 
boundaries . . . allow[ing] the user to block offensive Internet content that originates 
. . . from anywhere in the world. . . . Third, the First Amendment right to free speech 
is better served by user based filtering programs rather than any form of government 
regulation . . . .277 
 
Like anything else in the technological world, these software programs are not 
perfect.  Regulation supporters argue software which filters material rated by third 
parties is deficient for two reasons.  First, because the software cannot block every 
questionable site, a determined child could bypass the filter and find indecency on the 
Internet.278  Second, critics claim the software is overly effective in that it blocks 
access to sites with appropriate material.279  For example, some of the programs utilize 
string-recognition software which rejects certain four-letter words embedded in text.280 
 CYBERsitter utilized this feature to white out certain selected words while displaying 
the rest of the text, resulting in changing the sentence “President Clinton opposes 
                                                 
274  Gobla, supra  note 8, at 127-28. 
275  Id. at 128. 
276  Dobeus, supra  note 19, at 634; Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453, 472-74 (1997).  Unrated sites must be blocked or too many 
questionable sites will filter through.  Id. at 471.  The majority of the industry believes 
blocking unrated sites is necessary, or the rating system will not be useful.  Id. at 471-72. 
277  Dobeus, supra  note 19, at 657 (footnotes omitted).  According to the plaintiffs in ACLU 
v. Reno II: 
Unlike the COPA, user-based solutions provide a way for concerned parents to 
prevent sexually oriented material from reaching minors: (1) from foreign sites; (2) 
from amateur or non-commercial commercial sites; and (3) from sites that require a 
credit card for payment. The use of such software is also notably less restrictive 
than the COPA’s criminal ban. 
American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, Temporary Restraining Order Brief in 
ACLU v. Reno II (visited Nov. 20, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/court/acluvrenoII_tro.html> 
[hereinafter TRO Brief]. 
278  Robert W. Peters, There is a Need to Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 6 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 363, 364 (1997); see also  Jon Bigness, Sifting Problems of Web Filters, CHI. 
TRIB., Feb. 16, 1998, at 3 (noting filtering software effectiveness depends a great deal on the 
taste level and care of the publishers that produce the software because the publisher 
chooses the sites they consider inappropriate for children). 
279  Electronic Privacy Information Center, Faulty Filters: How Content Filters Block 
Access to Kid-Friendly Information on the Internet (Dec. 1997) (visited Jan 21, 1999) 
<http://www2.epic.org/reports/filter-report.html> (finding that filtering software prevented 
kids from accessing useful information available on the Internet as evidenced by a test the 
Center conducted which showed out of 100 searches, the software prevented access to 
almost 90 percent of material which contained the search terms because of the filter); see 
generally David J. Loundy, Filtering Software Poses Legal Pitfalls, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., 
March 12, 1998, at 5. 
280  Weinberg, supra note 276, at 460. 
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homosexual marriage” to “President Clinton opposes marriage.”281  However, 
companies may solve these types of problems by improving software design.282 
 
Self-rating systems receive criticism because they require authors of Internet 
content to  voluntarily rate their sites with rigid labels.283  If they refuse to apply a label, 
filters will probably block the site.284  Critics argue that this leaves little incentive to self-
rate sites containing questionable material because filtering software blocks it, 
regardless of whether it is rated.285  However, self-rating systems are a less restrictive 
means to protect children than government regulation.   
 
This is a free market economy.  If consumers (parents) wish to purchase filtering 
software that is “overly effective” and blocks unrated sites, that is their choice.286  If 
consumers want access to unrated sites, they may purchase a less effective type of 
software.  The objective behind the creation of filtering software was to empower 
parents to monitor children’s Internet access to indecency, rather than passing 
government regulations to do so.287  Now we need to let parents use that power as they 
see fit.288  This includes acknowledging that consumers have a choice of which 
software to buy based on, in part, their feelings regarding the imperfections of the 
various software programs. 
 
                                                 
281  Id.  Another example of a difficulty with string-recognition software occurred when 
software utilized by America Online would not let users from “Scunthorpe,” England, register 
with the service.  Id.  Also, Surfwatch software prevented the University of Kansas Medical 
Center from accessing their own “Archie R. Dykes Medical Library [sic].” Id.  Some 
companies, like CYBERsitter, filter out gay and lesbian sites even when they do not contain a 
reference to sex.  Id. at 461.  This is most likely a temporary setback because eventually most 
rating services will correct the labels on each of these document.  Id. at 460. 
282  Id. 
283  Rappaport, supra  note 144, at 807; Charlie Stross, RSACi Ratings Dissected (vis ited 
10/25/98) <http://www.antipope.org/charlie/nonfiction/rant/rsaci.html> (finding RSACi system 
cannot evaluate content for literary, educational or social value and, therefore, labels force the 
author of a safe sex message to group it with web sites depicting explicit sexual material). 
284  Weinberg, supra  note 276, at 471-72 (finding that rating services will probably block 
access to all unrated sites because too much questionable material would filter through for 
them to market themselves as reliable screeners). 
285  Dobeus, supra  note 19, at 647.  The legislature introduced a bill mandating that Internet 
access providers provide screening software to permit parents to control internet access by 
their children.  Family-Friendly Internet Access Act of 1997, H.R. 1180, 105th Cong. (1997).  
Compare Weinberg, supra  note 276, at 473-77 (finding a mandatory self-rating law is 
unconstitutional because it requires a speaker to associate himself with an idea with which he 
disagrees). 
286  Weinberg, supra  note 276, at 476 (finding that even if software did not block unrated 
sites, parents still may restrict children’s access to them by instructing the software to block 
unrated sites). 
287  Restricting Speech, supra  note 234, at 415 (stating the industry voluntarily developed 
filtering software as a tool for parents to use in limiting access by their children to 
questionable material on the Internet). 
288  The Supreme Court has a long line of precedent recognizing parental rights to raise 
their children as they see fit.  See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking 
down a law that required children to attend public schools because it interfered with the 
rights of parents to direct the education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923) (striking down a law that banned teaching children foreign languages because it 
interfered with parent’s rights to control the education of their children).  
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Parents who allow their children to participate in new technology must step forward 
and assume the responsibility of protecting them.289  Giving parents the responsibility of 
monitoring their children allows them to shield their children as they see fit, while 
“making the Internet a safer place for the Constitution.”290  Parents should not look to 
Congress to legislate away parental responsibility that is “part and parcel of rearing 
children.”291  Allowing Congress to do so 
 
gets the federal government into a job in which it has no business - parenthood, a 
job which doubtless should be left to parents. Any parents who believe they need 
the government’s help to raise their kids should be forced to leave their 16-year-old 
daughter with Bill Clinton for a weekend.292 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Internet is a vast global universe of ideas and interactive communication.  Entry 
into this universe is inexpensive, as well as fast, effective, and anonymous.  It is unlike 
any other form of media encountered in our planet’s history.   
 
Federal regulations employed to regulate the unique characteristics of the Internet 
will lead to a ruling of unconstitutionality.293  The CDA was the victim of such a 
decision after the government’s first round of Internet legislation.294  COPA is the 
second round of legislation and it also raises First Amendment questions.  This time the 
legislation attempts to regulate under the guise of “the protection of children.”295  No 
matter how one feels about the importance of protecting children from harmful 
materials, COPA is still unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored to meet that 
goal.296   
 
                                                 
289  Gobla, supra  note 8, at 129.  According to Albert Vezza, an MIT senior research 
scientist working on the development of filtering software standards, technology is just a tool 
and “[t]he real answer is parenting: understanding what your kids are doing online, talking to 
them about it and guiding them.”  Peters, supra  note 278, at 366; see also  Anne R. Carey and 
Web Bryant, USA Snapshots: Who’s Watching Kids On Line, USA TODAY, Sept. 24, 1998, at 
1A (finding the following percentages of parents whose children have Internet access sit with 
the children and participate: 36% Never; 25% Occasionally; 24% Always; 13% Rarely; and 2% 
Don’t Know). 
290  Wu, supra  note 13, at 301.  But see Clapes, supra  note 35, at 10 (finding it is not 
primarily the parent’s burden to protect children from indecent material on the Internet 
because it is the industry that brought obscenity into homes, and therefore, it has 
commensurate responsibility to control it). 
291  Restricting Speech, supra  note 234, at 415. 
292  Myers, supra  note 182, at A4. 
293  Gobla, supra  note 8, at 128-29 (finding any federal law will be overbroad and 
unconstitutional because it is impossible to define a community by which to judge what 
material is unlawful). 
294  Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2349-51 (1997) (striking down portions of the CDA due to 
vagueness and overbreadth). 
295  For a discussion on COPA and the reasons for which Congress enacted it, see supra 
Part I.F. 
296  For discussion on why COPA is unconstitutional, see supra  Part III.A & B.  Any 
content-based regulation is subject to strict scrutiny, which means the regulation must be 
necessary to serve a compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve 
that interest.  Arkansas Writers’ Project Inc., v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987). 
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Parents who allow their children to use the Internet must step up and assume the 
responsibility to protect them from harmful materials, in spite of the fact it may be 
easier to “pass the buck” to the government.297  Filtering software offers parents an 
effective solution and is far less restrictive than COPA, which imposes criminal 
penalties on constitutionally protected speech between adults.298  Therefore, Internet 
regulation should begin at home. 
 
Kelly M. Doherty 
                                                 
297  Myers, supra  note 182, at A4 (finding speech cannot be criminalized just because some 
find it potentially harmful to children); Gobla, supra  note 8, at 129.  “Those parents who allow 
their children to participate in that [new] technology must also accept the responsibility of 
monitoring their children.”  Id. 
298  TRO Brief, supra  note 277 (noting that Congress recognized it had not done thorough 
research on other alternatives before passing COPA and concluding that if Congress had 
done a thorough investigation, it would have revealed other less restrictive available 
alternatives). 
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